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VEDIC TERMS DENOTING VIRTUES AND MERITS 
Henk W. Bodewitz, Leiden University 
Abstract  
In an other publication (BODEWITZ, 2007a) I have discussed the lists of cardinal sins and vices, 
their specifications in the Veda and their parallels in the Western and Christian tradition. Now I 
will treat their positive counterparts (the virtues and merits), which do not have such clear enume-
rations (and partial parallels outside the Veda).1 Here the meaning of a few terms used to denote 
virtues and merits will be discussed, and an attempt will be made to get some information on their 
actual contents and background. 
There are five Sanskrit equivalents for virtue or merit: gu۬á, dhárma, suk܀tám, 
pú۬yam and Ğobhanám2, but only suk܀tám and pú۬yam are regularly found in the 
Vedic ritualistic and philosophical texts. They especially refer to meritorious 
actions or their resulting merits. 
The adj. Ğobhaná (‘excellent, auspicious, virtuous’) and the neuter noun 
Ğobhanám (‘something auspicious, virtue’) resemble pú۬ya and púnyam with 
their meaning and function, but are post-Vedic in this respect and therefore will 
not be treated here. In his commentaries on Vedic texts SƗya৆a sometimes uses 
these terms to explain the Vedic concepts of suk܀tá(m) and púnya(m). See the 
following quotations made by GONDA, 1966: 116, n. 6 and 117: Ğobhana-
yƗgƗdƯnƗۦ kartƗ yajamƗnaۊ; ĞobhanadƗnayuktƗya yajamƗnƗya and Ğobhanasya 
kartƗram. 
The term gu۬á seems to characterize the human qualities, pregnantly the 
good qualities, excellences, merits, virtues. However, with these meanings it is 
1  The cardinal virtues according to Plato are four: wisdom or prudence (sofia), fortitude 
(andria), temperance (sofrosune) and justice (dikaiosune), to which the Christian tradition 
has added faith, hope and love or charity. 
2  See MYLIUS, 1992 (s.v. “Tugend”), who s.v. “Verdienst” again mentions suk܀tám and 
pú۬yam, and then adds pǌrtám, which clearly is a mistake, since it does not denote the 
concept of merit as such but refers to a specific merit (namely reward, gift). See the 
Dvandva compound i܈ܒƗpǌrtám which denotes two specific merits (see e.g. GONDA, 1965: 
237). In PƗli “Tugend” and “Verdienst” are i.a. denoted by puñña. See MYLIUS, 2008, s.v. 
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almost exclusively post-Vedic and especially found in the epics and Manu. 
Therefore it will be left out of account here.  
The duties of man, his prescribed virtuous conduct as well as its religious 
merits are denoted by the noun dhárma. As such it is likewise mainly post-Vedic 
(especially if the Vedic dharmasǌtras are left out of account). 
The virtues or merits called suk܀tám and pú۬yam play a role in contexts 
dealing with the aim of reaching heaven (and immortality). They will be dis-
cussed in the next sections. 
1. The merit of suk܀tám 
The suk܀tám (or suk܀tyƗ´) is accomplished by the suk ´܀t (the virtuous or meri-
torious man) who on account of this suk܀tám mostly wins the world of suk܀tám 
or of the suk ´܀ts. Gonda, 1965: 129, correctly observes: “The suk܀taۊ are those 
who have acquitted themselves well of their religious duties, earned the merits 
thereof and enjoy the reward of their ritual meritorious deeds in the other 
world.” See also p. 123 where “the world of religious merit” is indeed the 
required translation. 
However, in a later publication (GONDA, 1966: 115–143) he changed his 
ideas. Now the suk܀tám is interpreted as something (especially or almost exclu-
sively a ritual) which has been correctly or accurately carried out. The resulting 
merit would be based on the good quality of the performance and the root kar 
would refer to the ritual work. The suk ´܀t would be someone who is “doing 
(sacrificial) work well” (p. 118). The negative counterpart of the suk ´܀t, the 
du܈k ´܀t, then would be someone who makes mistakes in the performance of the 
sacrifice, but Gonda only once mentions him (p. 121). His rather helpless obser-
vation on these ‘bad performers’ is: “who in any case are demeritorious people 
who may be burdened with the sins and inauspicious deeds of the others”. 
His treatment of du܈k܀tám, the negative counterpart of suk܀tám, is referred 
to a mystifying meganote (p. 126–128), which makes it clear that Gonda here 
has to admit that du܈k܀tám in fact means something like sin, vice or demerit. For 
a criticism of Gonda’s interpretation of suk܀tám and of TULL, 1989, who 
followed Gonda, see BODEWITZ, 1998 (588, n. 11 and 590 f.) with further 
references (i.a. BODEWITZ, 1993). 
It is quite clear that suk܀tám denotes the merit which qualifies man for life 
after death in heaven. It is also evident that in the ritualistic literature of the 
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Veda the best way for gaining merit is the ritual, but this does not imply that the 
activity expressed by the root kar in suk܀tám would exclusively refer to the per-
formance (by priests) of rituals of which the quality were to be expressed by su3. 
This means that more information on the nature of the merit denoted by the term 
suk܀tám (to be distinguished from the adjective súk܀ta, which has a different 
accentuation and means ‘well made’) is required. 
1.1 What has to be done for obtaining merit (suk৚tám) and by whom? 
The term suk܀tám often or even mostly denotes the reward for particular positive 
actions or behaviour stored in heaven for the human beings whose positive 
activity receives merits which produce a continuation of life after death in the 
heavenly world. This world is called the place, world or loká of the suk܀tám (the 
earned merit) or of the suk ´܀ts (the meritorious human beings who are already 
living there), but the earth is the place where this merit can be produced. See ৙V 
10, 61, 6, where in a description of the myth of cosmic incest the seed falls on 
the surface (of the earth), in the source (or womb) (yóni) of suk܀tám. In the 
introduction to this hymn, GELDNER, 1951, observes on this verse: “Der Inzest 
wird ausdrücklich als Guttat bezeugt.” The pouring out of seed may also be 
interpreted as a sacrifice in which the seed as an oblation is poured on the earth 
regarded as the sacrificial place where the future benefits are produced. Cf. ৙V 
3, 29, 8, where Agni is asked to place the sacrifice (yajñá) in the birthplace of 
merit (suk܀tásya yónau). GONDA, 1966: 143, prefers the translation “birth-place 
of the meritorious act”. However, the yóni is the place out of which merit is pro-
duced (by an activity which is meritorious). That the result of a sacrifice is de-
noted by suk܀tám also appears from a verse in TS 7, 3, 11, 2, where the sacrifice 
is said to produce merit (suk܀tám) (i.e. continuation of life in heaven), cattle and 
offspring. 
The reward for positive activity looks like the doctrine of karma, which, 
however, is not restricted to a life after death in heaven, but also refers to rebirth 
on earth (directly after death or after a limited stay in heaven). Moreover, life 
3  See HORSCH, 1971: 127: “Besonders aufschlussreich ist in diesem Zusammenhang der Ter-
minus suk܀tá, ‘Guttat’, da er bereits eine moralische Nuance enthält. […] Sicherlich ist die-
ses Handeln noch vorwiegend rituell bestimmt, so dass der Ausdruck ‘Tugend’ für suk܀tá 
nur beschränkt zutrifft.” His approach is rather confusing. I prefer to interpret suk܀tám as 
merit, a more general term than virtue, which moreover may include items outside the 
sphere of morals like sacrifices. 
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after death in heaven where one enjoys some sort of continuation of the earthly 
life, is not the ultimate aim of the doctrine of karma which is associated with the 
theory of mok܈a (missing in the oldest phases of Vedic religion). So at best one 
may regard the ideas about suk܀tám (meritorious activity and the resulting merit 
stored in heaven) as predecessors of the doctrine of karma.4 Rebirth on earth is 
not based on merits, but qualified by the moral or ethical good or bad nature of 
one’s behaviour. Release from this rebirth is not produced by merits or ethics 
and only plays a role in late Vedic texts. 
The connection of suk܀tám with Vedic ritual is not to be denied and is even 
to be expected in Vedic texts, which mainly deal with ritual. Now the following 
questions remain to be answered. Does the meritorious behaviour exclusively 
concern the ritual? Are the suk ´܀ts who obtain the merit of their activities (the 
suk܀tám in heaven) the sacrificers (YajamƗnas) or the priests in case the heaven-
ly suk܀tám would be obtained by means of sacrifices denoted as suk܀tám? Does 
Gonda’s interpretation of suk܀tám as ‘well and accurately performed ritual’ 
exclude the role of the YajamƗnas, who hardly carry out actions in the ritual? 
There are not many passages in the Vedic literature in which the concepts 
of suk܀tám and suk ´܀ts evidently do not concern the performance of rituals. In 
most contexts these terms explicitly refer to the ritual or at least do not exclude 
their association with rituals. The following examples form an exception. 
1.2 The non-sacrificial suk৚tám 
In BƖU 6, 4, 3, a man appropriates the suk܀tam of a woman with whom he has 
sexual intercourse, if he has a particular knowledge about the symbolism of this 
act and of the role of women in this connection. GONDA, 1966: 121, n. 30, refers 
this passage to a note and does not explain what is “the ‘merit’ of the women” 
here. It is clear that this merit cannot have been accumulated by sacrifices, since 
4  See BODEWITZ, 1998: 589 ff.. BOLLÉE, 1956: 38, even translates suk܀tam with “good karma” 
in ৡaঌvB. 1, 6, 1. GONDA, 1966: 129, accepts this rendering more or less and states that it 
“may do duty for practical purposes”, but also observes: “The only question […] is that as to 
the character of the ‘good karma’, how and by what activities it was acquired. The context 
itself points, of course, in the direction of ritual performances.” It is true that the context of 
this passage is ritualistic and deals with expiatory measures against ritualistic mistakes 
which may deprive the deceased in heaven from enjoying their merits (suk܀tam), but the 
passage does not state that the mentioned merits had been obtained by the discussed ritual 
(with its faults) or by ritual at all. 
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women do not carry out sacrifices or organize them, as the YajamƗnas do; they 
are only present. 
The text continues (6, 4, 4) with the statement that the men concerned leave 
this world at death without merits (visuk܀tas), if they miss the knowledge re-
quired for this situation, since they lose it to the women concerned. Gonda (who 
translates visuk܀tas with “devoid of merit”) observes: “The very occurrence of 
the compound vi-suk܀t- corroborates the view that suk܀t- was a fixed, more or 
less ‘technical’ term.”5 This may be correct (apart from the wrong analysis vi-
suk܀t- instead of vi-suk܀ta-; see n. 5), but would imply that suk܀tám primarily 
means ‘merit’ and that the exact nature of the origin of this merit need not be the 
accurate performance of a ritual.  
See also BƖU 6, 4, 12, where the Dvandva compound i܈ܒƗsuk܀te (referring 
to the sacrificed material or the sacrifice as such and the merit which are taken 
away from someone) implies that suk܀tam need not be identical with the sacri-
fice. All translators of this place distinguish suk܀tam from the merits earned by 
sacrifices. The Dvandva compound i܈ܒƗsuk܀te looks like a variation of i܈ܒƗ-
pǌrtam and this means that suk܀tam here is identical with pǌrtam, the merit of 
giving to human beings instead of offering to the gods.6 The liberality expressed 
by pǌrtam is not limited to giving presents to individuals (i.e. dƗnam) but may 
also refer to benefactions like establishing resthouses where all travellers might 
eat from one’s food (as king JƗnaĞruti did according to ChU 4, 1, 1). So pǌrtam 
is like suk܀tam a form of doing good. 
A woman also plays a role in connection with suk܀tám in ৙V 10, 95, 17, 
where Purǌravas asks for UrvaĞƯ’s return and then says: úpa tvƗ rƗtíۊ suk܀tásya 
tí܈ܒhƗn ní vartasva, which GELDNER, 1951, translates “Auf dass der Lohn der 
Guttat dir zuteil werde, kehre um”. GONDA, 1966: 125, n. 49, interprets rƗtíۊ 
suk܀tásya as “the gift of the well-prepared offering” and observes that the mortal 
Purǌravas warns UrvaĞƯ: “if she departs without more, the fruits of her deeds 
may not await her”. However, UrvaĞƯ is an Apsaras and a woman and does not 
sacrifice and therefore cannot wait in vain for the merits of sacrifices stored for 
her in heaven. Probably her suk܀tám is her return to Purǌravas and the reward 
5  Gonda makes the impression of analysing visuk܀t as vi-suk܀ta (‘without suk܀ta’), which is 
not possible, since the prefix vi- is followed by suk܀t and not by the noun suk܀tam. However, 
it is evident that the correct reading of the compound in the plural should be visuk܀tƗs. See 
BƖU 6, 4, 12 and KauৢU 1, 4, where visuk܀ta occurs in the singular and means ‘without 
suk܀tam’.  
6  See n. 2. 
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would be given by him in the form of a nice renewal of their association (per-
haps with sexual implications). 
The fact that suk܀tam occurs together with two other terms of which the one 
refers to (i.a.) the sacrifice (i܈ܒƗpǌrtam) and the other to asceticism (tapas) in JB 
1, 97 may be an indication that suk܀tam does not simply mean the correct per-
formance of a ritual. The sentence asmin vƗ ayaۦ loke pu۬yaۦ jƯvitve܈ܒƗpǌrtena 
tapasƗ suk܀tenƗsmƗn anvƗgami܈yati admits of various interpretations in as far as 
the construction is concerned. CALAND, 1919: 20, may be right in taking the 
three instrumentals with anvƗgami܈yati and translating “dieser wird, nachdem er 
auf dieser Welt […] gut gelebt hat, durch Opferverdienst, Askese, Guttat uns 
nachfolgen.” My own translation (BODEWITZ, 1990: 111) runs: “Having lived a 
meritorious life in this world with sacrificing and liberality, asceticism and good 
deeds he will follow us (and reach heaven)” and assumes that the pu۬ya way of 
life in general is decisive. Anyhow, the context (1, 98) makes it clear that good 
behaviour rather than perfectly performed ritual is at stake. The gods introduce 
evil or bad behaviour in this world for man in order to prevent his rising to 
heaven. They even appoint Agni to obstruct the successful attempts to reach 
heaven of him who has overcome the innate, evil traits given to him by the gods 
and wants to behave in a virtuous way (yas […] asmin loke sƗdhu cikƯr܈Ɨt). I am 
convinced that sƗdhu (k܀), pu۬yam (jƯv) and suk܀tam more or less belong to-
gether in this passage and refer to good behaviour, whereas correct performance 
of the sacrifice does not play a role here.7 
7  The parallelism of the suk܀t and the pu۬yak܀t had to be admitted by GONDA, 1966: 120, who 
nevertheless translates suk܀tas with “those who have acquitted themselves well of their ritual 
duties” and pu۬yak܀tas with “those who do right-good-pure deeds”. It is obvious that both 
have a meritorious behaviour and that the correctness of the performance of rituals hardly 
plays a role. The ritual as such rather than its exact performance produces the merit. For 
sƗdhuk܀tyƗ representing suk܀tam see also JB 1, 18, where after having reached the suk܀ta-
rasa the deceased gives the sƗdhuk܀tyƗ to the Pit৚s. In this late Vedic passage the deceased 
does not need any more his suk܀tam, since by knowledge of his identity with the highest god 
he has become released. On the other hand, Ka৬hU 2, 24 does not regard knowledge alone as 
sufficient and states that duĞcaritam (= du܈k܀tam) forms a hindrance. That this sƗdhuk܀tyƗ 
(= suk܀tam) refers to virtuous behaviour in general appears from the parallel passage JB 1, 
50, where the deceased gives to his forefathers whatever pu۬yam he had done in his life and 
this pu۬yam is in the same passage denoted by the term sƗdhuk܀tyƗ. His enemies receive his 
pƗpak܀tyƗ. This opposition between relatives and enemies who receive one’s merits and 
demerits in general (without any clear association with good and bad sacrifices) is expressed 
by KauৢU 1, 4 with an opposition between dear relatives and enemies (or relatives who are 
not dear) who receive suk܀tam and du܈k܀tam. The transfer of merits has a counterpart in a 
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The agreement of suk܀tam and pu۬yam also appears from the fact that the 
essence or fluid form (representing food in life after death?) (-rasa) of meri-
torious behaviour (i.e. the merit in heaven) may be preceded in a compound by 
suk܀ta- as well as by the genitive of pu۬yak܀tyƗ. See JB 1, 18 and JUB 3, 3, 4, 6, 
where the deceased comes to the suk܀tarasa in heaven and JUB 1, 9, 3, 4, where 
the “sap of good action” (pu۬yak܀tyƗyai rasaۊ, see OERTEL, 1894) is situated 
beyond the sun. 
Even a human being may be denoted by the term suk܀tam. In AƖ 2, 4, 2 the 
deities refuse to enter a cow or a horse arguing that these living beings are not 
good enough for them. They approve of man and say suk܀taۦ bata and the text 
explains this with puru܈o vƗva suk܀tam. I think that the first suk܀tam means 
‘Well done!’ and the second ‘something meritorious’ or ‘the origin of merit’ 
(just like the place of the sacrifice is the place where merits are produced). There 
seems to be a wordplay of súk܀tam (= sú k܀tám) and suk܀tám in this passage, 
which unfortunately has no accentuation.  
In ĝB 4, 1, 4, 5, two persons (a king and his Purohita) are associated with 
du܈k܀tám and suk܀tám in case one of the two is without special merits and their 
cooperation would be unsuccessful. EGGELING, 1885, translates: “[…] let not a 
BrƗhman desire to become the Purohita of any one Kshatriya (he may meet 
with), as thereby righteousness and unrighteousness unite; nor should a Ksha-
triya make any BrƗhman (he may meet with) his Purohita, as thereby righteous-
ness and unrighteousness unite.” GONDA, 1966: 126 f., n. 53, criticizes Eggeling 
and observes: “The suk܀tam in all probability consists in having, or being, a 
(competent) purohita, the du܈k܀tam in making someone a purohita who may 
prove unfit for this profession or in serving an unworthy kৢatriya. If this inter-
pretation is not beside the mark the suk܀tam results from the correct observance 
of the social and religious rules, of the dharma, the du܈k܀tam from their disre-
gard.” Gonda overlooks the fact that not the choice of a Purohita or his accep-
tation of the invitation as such are suk܀tám or du܈k܀tám, but that one of the two 
persons may represent suk܀tám and the other du܈k܀tám. These two persons are 
qualified as merit and demerit (suk܀tám and du܈k܀tám). It seems that Gonda was 
misled by the neuter form of the two nouns, which here definitely refer to 
________________________________ 
transfer of demerits. The merits expressed by suk܀tam may partially consist of sacrifices but 
need not exclusively be produced by sacrifices let alone by the quality of their performances. 
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persons. The possible suk܀tám associated with a king has nothing to do with his 
ritual experience, nor does his possible du܈k܀tám with his inability in rituals.8  
The localisation of suk܀tám mostly is heaven (the destination of merit 
earned on earth) or (on earth) the place of sacrifice. There are some exceptions. 
In ৙V 10, 85, 24 the bride becomes separated from the house of her parents and 
placed in the womb of order (܀tásya yónau) and the world of merit (suk܀tásya 
loké) together with her husband; i.e. she becomes lawfully married. GONDA, 
1966: 142, rightly criticizes the translation of (i.a.) GELDNER, 1951, in which the 
world of suk܀tám is interpreted as heaven, but does not deny that the sacrifice on 
earth cannot be meant here. He supposes that the localisation should be taken as 
“the married state regarded as a manifestation of ৚ta and of (the merit gained by) 
right action”.9 Indeed lawful marriage (i.e. started according to ৙ta) is a stage of 
life in which the bride (on account of her association with her husband) may 
gain merit (suk܀tám). However, the winning of merit by sacrifices hardly plays a 
role here. 
On the same page Gonda deals with AV 14, 1, 59, where the bride leaves 
the house of her parents and the gods should place her in suk܀tám (in the future 
home?). He concludes: “Here the term practically comes to ‘happiness’. […] 
Suk܀tam used here without any reference to ritual activities and merits seems to 
have acquired a more or less fixed character, but we should remember that 
marriage too is a ritual act.” So it is not clear whether Gonda regards the suk܀tám 
in which the bride is placed as the “married state” (see above) or as a marriage 
ritual. His remark on suk܀tám having developed (from the bliss of merit obtained 
in heaven and based on perfectly carried out rituals) to a “more or less fixed cha-
racter” of happiness in general, raises some questions, since the AV is not a very 
late Vedic text. I suppose that married life is suk܀tám because it potentially 
8  After this unconvincing treatment of ĝB 4, 1, 4, 5, Gonda continues his note with comments 
on several passages in which du܈k ´܀t and du܈k܀tám are discussed and the association of these 
terms with the ritual becomes more and more vague. At the end of his note 53, Gonda 
discusses AB 2, 7, 12, where the formula “O slayers, whatever shall here be well done, to us 
that; whatever ill done, elsewhere that” is used in addressing the slayers of the sacrificial 
victim. Gonda assumes that the correct or wrong performance is meant here. Indeed, the 
prose context seems to explain it in some way like this. However, the killing as such may be 
associated with merit and demerit. The slayers receive the demerit of the cruel action, the 
priests and the sacrificer the merit. The correctness of the ritual does not play a role in the 
formula. 
9  On such a non-physical, non-cosmographic ‘world’ see also GONDA, 1966: 68, discussing 
the bhadrasya loka and referring to “English phrases such as ‘the scientific world, the sport-
ing world’” by way of comparison. 
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provides the opportunity of gaining merit (especially in comparison with the 
state of being an unmarried woman). There is no implication of rituals, let alone 
of sacrifices, and certainly not of their accurate and correct performance. 
In ৙V 7, 35, 4 the suk܀tƗni of the suk ´܀ts are invoked for the human beings 
and RENOU, 1959: 40, rightly translates “Heur nous soient les bienfaits des 
(dieux) bien-faisants”, because rituals and deceased sacrificers cannot play a role 
here. 
1.3 The role of the YajamƗna as the suk ৚´t 
Man and wife are both called suk ´܀t in AV 12, 3, 44. Both are indeed involved in 
an Atharvavedic ritual in which a meal is offered as a Dakৢi৆Ɨ. The epithet 
translated with “performing pious deeds” by BLOOMFIELD, 1897: 191, is rather 
general and hardly refers to the correctness of their ritual activities (i.e. the 
cooking of the meal), but concerns their willingness to organize such a ritual and 
to give the meal to the priest. The accurateness of their contribution to this 
simple ritual does not play a role. 
Two suk ´܀t’s are mentioned in ৙V 3, 31, 2. The one seems to be the maker 
or producer of the sacrificial fire (i.e. the priest), the other he who takes the 
profit (i.e. the YajamƗna). The hymn is rather obscure. If the given interpretation 
is correct, the YajamƗna may be the one who obtains the suk܀tám (the merit) as 
an ƖhitƗgni, whereas the priest is the one who carries out the meritorious action 
(the AgnyƗdhƗna). GONDA, 1966: 118, criticizes Geldner’s translation “Guttä-
ter”. It is possible, however, that two meanings of the term are used in this 
obscure hymn. As ‘skilful’ it applies to the priest who produces fire, as ‘doing 
good’ it denotes the organizer of the AgnyƗdhƗna, the sacrificer. The priest does 
not win the suk܀tám in heaven. This merit is for the sacrificer.10 
In several passages the YajamƗnas are explicitly called the doers and win-
ners of suk܀tám. The participle ƯjƗná is used with the noun suk ´܀t and then in-
dicates that the suk ´܀t has been a YajamƗna. See e.g. AV 9, 5, 8 and 12 occurring 
in a hymn dealing with the offering of a goat and five rice-dishes. Here the 
world of the suk ´܀t’s is that of men who have organized sacrifices, paid the 
offerings and given Dakৢi৆Ɨs to the Brahmin priests. The priests are not the 
suk ´܀t’s. It is the YajamƗna who meets after death with the merit of what he has 
sacrificed to the gods and given to human beings (especially priests). See e.g. TS 
10  See JAMISON, 1991: 19, who observes that the priests do the actual ritual work and that the 
YajamƗna derives all the benefit from the ritual. 
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3, 3, 8, 5 where he comes together with his i܈ܒƗpǌrtá (i.e. what he has offered 
and given). Therefore GONDA, 1966: 131, is wrong in translating suk´܀tƗm 
occurring in AV 9, 5, 8 in apposition with ƯjƗnƗ´nƗm with “who have performed 
the ritual well”, since the YajamƗnas are not the performers. According to AV 
11, 1, 17, the cooker of the rice-dish goes to the world of the suk ´܀t’s and there-
fore is a suk ´܀t himself. This cooker, however, is not a priest, but a YajamƗna 
who makes his wife cook the Brahmaudana for the Brahmins. His merit is the 
giving of the meal and the quality of the cooking is rather irrelevant. 
On these YajamƗnas see further AV 18, 3, 20, where ancient sacrificers are 
described as i܈ܒƗvantas (having offered to the gods), rƗti܈Ɨco dádhƗnƗۊ11 (givers 
of presents), dák܈i۬Ɨvantas (givers of Dakৢi৆Ɨs), suk ´܀tas (meritorious men). It is 
clear that the suk ´܀t is a suk ´܀t because he gives goods to gods and priests and that 
his doing good has nothing to do with the correctness of the performance of the 
ritual.12 See also ৙V 10, 122, 3, where Agni is addressed, and GONDA, 1966: 
116, mistranslates dƗ´Ğad dƗĞú܈e suk ´܀te with “when thou givest to the giver who 
performs (his ritual) work well”. The YajamƗna13 is someone who does good by 
giving and therefore Agni gives to him.  
The hymn ৙V 1, 125 consists of a conversation between a rich host and his 
guest, who is an itinerant singer and wants to have Dakৢi৆Ɨs or presents in 
general from his host. Liberality rather than a great sacrifice (which cannot be 
organized ad hoc) let alone the correctness of its performance plays a role. Here 
Gonda, 1966: 117) is aware of this fact and does not refer to the accurateness of 
11  WHITNEY, 1905, misinterprets these two words as “attached to giving […] bestowers”. See 
also GONDA, 1966: 117, who translates them with “dispensing gifts […] bestowing”. These 
persons make (dhƗ) other people (in general, or Brahmins) receivers (sƗc) of gifts. 
12  The correctness of the performance of the sacrifice and its opposite are expressed by svi܈ܒam 
and duri܈ܒam. A duri܈ܒam may consist of the offering of a barren cow. According to ĝB 4, 5, 
1, 7 (see GONDA, 1966: 126, n. 53) Varu৆a receives the ill-offered part of the sacrifice, 
makes it well-offered (svì܈ܒam) and returns the cow to the sacrificer as his own yájña (of-
fering) and as his own merit (suk܀tám). This indicates that suk܀tám here does not mean 
‘well-performed (sacrifice)’ but ‘merit’, as even Gonda has to admit. Following EGGELING, 
1885, he translates “his own sacrifice, his own suk܀tam, i.e. ritual merit.” The faults, for 
which the priests are responsible, are redressed by the gods and the sacrificer keeps his merit.  
13  SƗya৆a is quoted several times by GONDA, 1966: 116 f., who nevertheless keeps misunder-
standing the texts which he discusses. See the introductory remarks of my article in which 
SƗya৆a’s commentary is quoted (from Gonda) and the YajamƗna is explained as someone 
who is the doer of good (Ğobhanam), of meritorious (Ğobhana) items like sacrifices etc. and 
as someone who is engaged in the meritorious (Ğobhana) activity of liberality (dƗnam). 
There is no reference to the accuracy of the ritual performance. 
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a ritual, but observes that in verse 3 the singer “comes in search of the suk܀t- (i.e. 
the man who knows how to acquit himself of his social and ritual duties, the 
reception of a guest being a socio-religious affair...)”. However, in verse 5 this 
suk ´܀t primarily appears to reach heaven on account of his liberality (yáۊ p܀۬Ɨ´ti 
sá ha devé܈u gachati). See also ৙V 10, 107, 2, where in a hymn dedicated to the 
Dakৢi৆Ɨ we read “Hoch oben im Himmel haben die Dakৢi৆Ɨgeber ihren Stand, 
die Rosseschenker, die sind bei der Sonne. Die Goldschenker werden der Un-
sterblichkeit teilhaft, die Kleidschenker verlängern ihr Leben, a Soma” (tr. 
GELDNER, 1951).   
On the AV I have observed (1999a: 113): “Actually, in almost all the 
hymns in which life after death in heaven plays a role, items are given to 
Brahmins or deposited in or with them by way of oblation.”   
In AV 18, 4 it is perfectly clear that the suk ´܀t’s are the YajamƗnas. See AV 
18, 4, 1, where the ƯjƗná is placed in the world of the suk ´܀t’s; AV 18, 4, 2, where 
the ƯjƗnƗs are said to go to heaven; 18, 4, 3 where their predecessors, the Aৄgi-
rases, are called suk ´܀t’s; 18, 4, 7, where the yajñak ´܀t’s, the sacrifice-makers (i.e. 
the organizers of the sacrifices, the YajamƗnas), are called suk ´܀t’s ; AV 18, 4, 
14, where the deceased who is laid on the funeral pile is called ƯjƗná as well as 
suk ´܀t. In this hymn the term yájamƗna occurs in the verses 4–7. The YajamƗna is 
the real suk ´܀t, the maker of suk܀tám, which mostly means the maker (i.e. organi-
zer) of a sacrifice, the yajñak ´܀t.14 
At the end of a sacrifice in which thousand cows are given as Dakৢi৆Ɨs the 
last cow is asked to announce the sacrificer to the gods as a suk ´܀t in TS 7, 1, 6, 8; 
PB 20, 15, 15; JB 2, 267 and ĝB 4, 5, 8, 10, and here it is clear that the Yaja-
mƗna is called thus because he has given an enormous amount of cows. The 
quality of the sacrificer and his ritual is the quantity of his liberality. 
14  GONDA, 1966; 129, n. 57, comments on AV 18, 3 54, where a bowl filled with drinks is 
called the food of suk܀tám, which WHITNEY, 1905, translates with “a draught of what is well 
done”. Gonda observes: “The commentary supplies yajñasya to suk܀tasya: ‘of the act of 
worship (sacrifice) which has been correctly executed’.” In my view the commentary does 
not qualify the sacrifice as well done, but equates the merit (suk܀tám) with the sacrifice 
without explaining this as having a correct performance. The food (sometimes in fluid form: 
suk܀tarasa) of the deceased in heaven which consists of his merits may indeed have been 
stored by the oblations, though other forms of merits are not excluded. Anyhow the term 
suk܀tám just means merit here and does not refer to the nature of the performance of a ritual. 
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1.4 The suk৚tam in late Vedic texts 
The world in heaven won by (sacrificial or other) merits (the suk܀tasya loka) is 
the final and highest destination of man in the older Vedic literature. The 
obstruction to that goal is formed by demerits (du܈k܀tam, pƗpak܀tyƗ).15 In some 
late Vedic texts the highest aim is no longer a continuation of life in a world of 
merit (suk܀tasya loka) and therefore one wants to get rid of one’s du܈k܀tam as 
well as one’s suk܀tam.16 The obstruction to a higher state in heaven in the form 
of some sort of deliverance (mok܈a) now consists of a lack of the right 
knowledge.  
The oldest evidence is to be found in a late stage of the JB (JB 1, 18; 1, 46; 
1, 50). In JB 1, 46, the failure of man after death is described. He misses the 
right knowledge and is obstructed by the doorkeepers, i.e. he cannot shake off 
his suk܀tam and his du܈k܀tam. His sƗdhuk܀tyƗs disappear tripartitely. The door-
keeper of the highest world takes one third, one third disappears in the air, and 
with one third the deceased falls back in the direction of the earth, but stops in 
the world which has been earned by him with gifts (dƗnajita). This means that 
the sƗdhuk܀tyƗ (i.e. suk܀tam) of which two thirds had been lost, consists of 
dƗnam, a specification of the concept of merit which does not refer to the ritual 
as such, though in the form of dak܈i۬Ɨs may have connections with sacrifices. 
Again an indication that a world obtained in heaven need not be exclusively won 
by the correct performance of rituals. 
2. The merit of pú۬yam 
The adj. pu۬ya and the neuter noun pu۬yam have some differences and agree-
ments with the nouns suk܀tam and suk܀t. In comparison with them they are late-
15  The opposition of suk܀tam and du܈k܀tam has a better parallel in sucaritam and duĞcaritam 
(see ĝB 3, 3, 3, 13, where wrong behaviour is opposed to good behaviour and the opposetion 
has no moral aspects, but refers to social etiquette) than in svi܈ܒam and duri܈ܒam (see n. 12 
on ĝB 4, 5, 1, 7), since it refers to religious behaviour and its merits rather than to the good 
and bad performance of a ritual. For duri܈ܒam and svi܈ܒam see also AB 3, 38, where 
otherwise than in ĝB 4, 5, 1, 7 (see n. 12) Varu৆a guards the svi܈ܒam of the sacrifice and a 
comparison is made with a field which is ill-plowed (du܈k܀܈ܒa) and then made suk܀܈ܒa. Here 
the correct performance (svi܈ܒa/suk܀܈ܒa) rather than the meritorious activity (suk܀tam) plays 
a role (in spite of the attractive similarity of -k܀܈ܒa and -k܀ta). 
16  See n. 7. 
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comers in Vedic literature. The term pu۬ya, occurring as an adjective, a neuter 
noun and in the beginning of compounds, hardly plays a role in the mantras of 
the Vedic SaীhitƗs. Though suk܀t and suk܀tam explicitly refer to actions and 
these actions often have some associations with the ritual, whereas pu۬ya(m) 
originally (and even later) sometimes denotes what is good, positive or 
auspicious in general, even the ritualistic BrƗhmana texts more often use pu۬ya, 
pu۬yam and their compounds. In the Vedic Upaniৢads pu۬ya more frequently 
occurs than suk܀ta. 
It is clear that the position of these terms dealing with merits has changed. 
The noun pu۬yam seems to have taken over the role of suk܀tam or at least have 
become equal to this denotation of something meritorious, which again may be 
an indication that suk܀tam does not express the correctness or accurateness of the 
ritualistic activity. It is possible that pu۬ya may ultimately have obtained moral 
and ethical connotations. In the Upaniৢads its associations with the theory of 
karma definitely play a role. 
The etymology of pu۬ya is disputed. Its basic meaning seems to refer to 
something which has a positive role and is auspicious, especially promising 
something good for the future. As such it need not have any moral implications. 
It is positive in that it points to future situations which are associated with 
happiness, prosperity, luck, success etc.17 This looks like the situation of suk܀tam 
which is the merit earned on earth which secures a future happy life in heaven. 
On the moral aspects of the term OLDENBERG, 1919: 195, observes: “pu۬ya 
ist später in der Karmanlehre mit ihrem scharfen Gegensatz von lohnbringendem 
und strafebringendem Handeln das hervortretendste Schlagwort auf der Seite des 
Guten”, and assumes as its original meanings: “mit Glück, Wohlsein, Gedeihen 
begabt; ferner: Glück bringend, das Wohlsein vermehrend.” See also p. 196: 
“Man sieht, dass mit pu۬ya von Haus aus nicht eigentlich das Gute als Gegen-
satz des Bösen gemeint ist.” However, the development from economic pro-
sperity to moral good cannot be traced in the terminology as accompanying the 
origin of the karma doctrine, since this occurs rather late in the Vedic literature, 
which in most texts associates doing good, meritorious work with a good future 
in heaven and does not pay much attention to the demerits and their results. The 
opposition between pu۬yam and pƗpam is found already before passages dealing 
with the karma doctrine, as will be shown in the following subsection 2.1. 
17  See e.g. ৙V 2, 43, 2 where luck is announced by the sound of a bird. On the other hand it 
may also qualify a characteristic which predicts such a luck. See AV 7, 115, 4 on a púnyƗ 
lak܈m Ư´. 
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KEITH, 1925: 469 f., states that the BrƗhma৆a texts did “not develop any 
theory of morality”, but further on (p. 479) observes that the term pu۬ya “slowly 
develops, in lieu of its purely unethical sense of ‘fortunate’ or ‘lucky’, the impli-
cation of goodness” and that it became “used in those passages of the Upaniৢads 
which touch on the essential connexion of the position of man in life as affected 
by the merit of his previous birth.” One may doubt, however, whether the merits 
(pu۬yam = suk܀tam) qualifying for a stay in heaven in the BrƗhma৆as are entire-
ly different from the merits determining the nature of a rebirth on earth in the 
Upaniৢads. According to HORSCH, 1971: 100, the rebirth would be determined 
by “vorwiegend ethisch qualifizierten […] Taten”. Did the merits of the ritual 
texts develop into virtues in the later Vedic texts? 
The agreements of pu۬yam and suk܀tam appear in the parallellism of 
pu۬yam + pƗpam and suk܀tam + du܈k܀tam, which will first be treated. 
2.1 pu৆yam = suk৚tam and pƗpam = duৢk৚tam 
The opposition of merits and demerits, virtues and sins, especially plays a role in 
passages dealing with life after death. One should get rid of demerits or sins in 
order to be qualified for a loka in heaven, but of demerits or sins as well as of 
merits or virtues in later Vedic texts in which the idea of mok܈a occurs for the 
first time. 
In post-Vedic texts in which pu۬yam is mentioned together with pƗpam, 
good and bad actions in general (and their resulting merits and demerits) are 
definitely meant. See e.g. the proverbs edited and translated by BÖHTLINGK, 
1870–1873, verse 2642 (= 1074 first ed.), where the effects, i.e. the merits and 
demerits, of very good and bad actions are enjoyed already on earth. Böhtlingk 
rightly translates atyugrapu۬yapƗpƗnƗm ihaiva phalam aĞnute with “Den Lohn 
für ungewöhnlich gute oder schlechte Thaten kostet man schon hier”. In verse 
134 (= 53 of the first ed.) the opposition is formulated with pu۬yam and 
du܈k܀tam, which implies that pu۬yam and suk܀tam are regarded as equal. The 
guest who is not well treated with hospitality, takes away the merits (pu۬yam) of 
the host and gives his own demerits (du܈k܀tam) to his host. According to Manu 
8, 91 the deity residing in one’s heart observes one’s good and evil deeds (see 
OLIVELLE, 2004): pu۬yapƗpek܈it܀. 
Now, I will treat the use of the opposition between good and bad in the Vedic 
texts, start with the ritualistic BrƗhma৆as in which the karman doctrine is still 
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missing and then continue with the Vedic Upaniৢads in which the first traces of 
this doctrine become playing a role. 
From ĝB 2, 5, 2, 8 it appears that the good deeds denoted as pú۬yam need 
not refer to sacrifices even in a ritualistic text like a BrƗhma৆a: tád yáthƗ pú۬-
yaۦ cakrú܈e pú۬yaۦ kuryƗ´d eváۦ tát “as one returns a good deed by doing good 
to the one who has done that deed”. It is not clear whether pú۬yam as the object 
of the verb kar here has any moral implications. The implied but not expressed 
opposition between pu۬yam and pƗpam here seems to belong to the sphere of 
profit and damage and quid pro quo. 
Though in the above discussed passage the use of the verb kar with as 
object pú۬yam does not necessarily imply that this object has a moral connota-
tion, mostly the use of this verb has this moral implication or at least refers to 
merits. See JB 1, 15, where the opposition of sƗdhu (instead of pu۬yam) k܀tam 
and pƗpaۦ k܀tam agrees with that of suk܀tam and du܈k܀tam in the question yaj 
jƯvan puru܈aۊ karoty eva sƗdhu karoti pƗpaۦ kƗ tayor du܈k܀tasuk܀tayor 
vyƗv܀ttir. In JB 1, 18 sƗdhu is likewise used instead of pu۬yam in the opposition 
with pƗpam, in a passage in which the lifebreath announces to the gods how 
much good and how much evil has been done on earth by the dead person (sa 
heyattƗۦ devebhya Ɨca܈ܒa iyad asya sƗdhu k܀tam iyat pƗpam iti)18. For such an 
announcement compare JUB 1, 5, 1, where the doorkeeper of heaven judges idaۦ 
vai tvam atra pƗpam akar nehai܈yasi yo ha vai pu۬yak܀t syƗt sa iheyƗd iti and 
pu۬ya forms an opposition with pƗpa in connection with the verb kar. The oppo-
sition of the pu۬yak܀t and the pƗpak܀t is also found in JB 1, 291, where it is ob-
served that here on earth pu۬yak܀tas as well as pƗpak܀tas are active, whereas in 
yonder world only pu۬yak܀tas are found. This opposition (like that of suk܀tas 
and du܈k܀tas) is too general to be limited to sacrificers.  
In ĝB 13, 5, 4, 3 we find an opposition between kárma pƗ´pakam and pú۬yaۦ 
kárma, in which the good (pú۬ya) activity is associated with a particular ritual 
and the bad (pƗ´paka) with sinful activity: PƗrik܈itƗ´ yájamƗnƗ aĞvamedhaíۊ 
parovará ájahuۊ kárma pƗ´pakaۦ pú۬yƗۊ pú۬yena kárma۬Ɨ. HORSCH, 1966: 
140, translates the last three words with “als Fromme mit frommer Tat”, kárma 
pƗ´pakam with “die böse Tat” and takes both singulars kárman as “Tat”, but in a 
note observes: “karman hier erstmals in ethischer Bedeutung?” I think that the 
bad karman should be interpreted as the collective bad activity and its results, 
but doubt whether this kárman has any relation with the doctrine of transmigra-
18  See BODEWITZ, 1973: 57, n. 12–13, referring to the weighing of good (sƗdhú) and wrong 
deeds in ĝB 11, 2, 7, 33. 
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tion. Anyhow a moral aspect is possible, but the substitution of the ethical kárman19 
by the ritualistic kárman points to the opposition of merits and demerits rather 
than of virtues and sins. 
JUB 1, 60, 1 and 2, 3, 6 state that with the mind (manas) one thinks what is 
good and what is evil (pu۬yaۦ cainena dhyƗyati pƗpaۦ ca). The difference be-
tween thinking (dhyƗy) and doing or committing (kar) is only gradual. So here 
again a moral opposition is expressed. 
PB 11, 5, 11 opposes the pu۬ya person to the pƗpƯyas as one person in two 
different situations. Here it is evident that no moral distinction is made. CA-
LAND, 1931, correctly translates: “Therefore, he, who having been formerly suc-
cessful, afterwards fares worse, should take the ƗkৢƗra(sƗman) as the Brahman’s 
chant. Unto him it (this sƗman) causes to flow (‘to return’) valour, strength (and) 
pith.” So here we see pu۬ya and pƗpa with the meanings ‘prosperous’ and ‘eco-
nomically or physically weak’. This is rather exceptional.  
On the situation in the Upaniৢads RODHE, 1946: 34, correctly observes that there 
“we find pƗpa constructed with karoti, consequently having the sense of wrong-
doing” and that “[a]s its contrast often pu۬ya, good, is mentioned”. 
The BƖU mentions some examples of the opposition of pu۬ya and pƗpa. In 
BƖU 1, 5, 20 the deceased after having transferred his vital powers to his son20 
now receives the cosmic or divine counterparts of three of these vital powers and 
becomes a god (i.e. PrajƗpati). From the divine or cosmic waters and the moon 
the central vital power in the form of a new, divine lifebreath enters him. The 
conclusion runs (in the translation of RADHAKRISNAN of 1953): “Whatever 
sufferings creatures may undergo, these remain with them. But only merit goes 
to him. No evil ever goes to the gods.” So pu۬yam goes to the divinized de-
ceased and pƗpam does not reach him, since pƗpam never reaches divine beings. 
If Radhakrishnan is right in taking pu۬yam as merit, then its opposite, pƗpam, 
19  On the non-ritual karman in the Veda see BODEWITZ, 1993, where some more examples of 
bad karman are treated. For the compensation of bad karman by the ritual see ĝB 1, 6, 1, 21, 
where the identification of the sacrificer with PrajƗpati implies that he who knows thus 
“whether he has a sacrifice performed for him while he is far away, or while he is near, the 
sacrifice is performed in the same way as it would be performed if he were near; and he who 
knows this, even though he do much evil, is not shut out from the sacrifice” (tr. EGGELING, 
1882). 
20  The context clearly does not point to the karma doctrine of transmigration, but the cosmifi-
cation of the deceased and his identification with PrajƗpati looks like a forerunner of the 
idea of mok܈a from this transmigration. 
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would be demerit or sin. Most translations are not very explicit in this respect. 
However, this passage reminds us of JB 1, 15, where someone who dies with a 
particular knowledge rises up as the vital breath with his good deeds (suk܀tam, 
i.e. whatever sƗdhu he has done) and leaves his bad deeds (du܈k܀tam, i.e. 
whatever pƗpam he has done) with his body. On the other hand one might also 
take the suffering which is left with the creatures (yad u kiۦ cemƗۊ prajƗۊ 
Ğocanti, amaivƗsƗۦ tad bhavati) as the opposite of pu۬yam and in that case the 
opposition would be that of good luck and distress. 
BƖU 3, 2, 13 pu۬yo vai pu۬yena karma۬Ɨ bhavati pƗpaۊ pƗpena definitely 
refers to good and bad activities and their results. However, it is unclear whether 
here a doctrine of karma and mok܈a is treated, because in the same context (3, 2, 
10) the outdated concept of overcoming redeath21 is mentioned. See DEUSSEN, 
1897: 431, on the rather undeveloped ideas of this passage and HORSCH, 1971: 
112, who speaks of a “Nebeneinander der zwei gegensätzlichen Eschatologien” 
which continued “bis in die Upaniৢaden” and then refers to the present passage.  
BƖU 4, 3, 15; 4, 3, 22 and 4, 3, 34 have pu۬yam and pƗpam as the objects 
of an other verb than kar, namely the verb ‘to see’. In the state of dreams one 
sees (i.e. experiences) good and evil, which have nothing to do with moral dis-
tinctions but refer to pleasant and unpleasant experiences. Therefore RODHE, 
1946: 34, is wrong in mentioning (one of) these places together with other 
Upaniৢadic passages in which the opposition of pu۬ya and pƗpa is found.  
In BƖU 4, 4, 5 (and its context) , however, pu۬ya and pƗpa occur together 
with the root kar and the noun karman. Here the two terms definitely refer to 
moral and immoral behaviour and the doctrine of karman and transmigration: 
yathƗkƗrƯ yathƗcƗrƯ tathƗ bhavati […] pu۬yaۊ pu۬yena karma۬Ɨ bhavati pƗpaۊ 
pƗpena. 
The much later PrU (in 3, 7) connects pu۬yam and pƗpam with life after 
death in a rather strange way: atha […] udƗnaۊ pu۬yena pu۬yaۦ lokaۦ nayati 
pƗpena pƗpam ubhƗbhyƗm eva manu܈yalokam “Now […] the upbreath leads, in 
consequence of good (work) to the good world, in consequence of evil to the evil 
world, in consequence of both to the world of men” (tr. RADHAKRISHNAN, 
1953). The third option probably refers to transmigration and rebirth on earth 
which depends on the mix of good and bad karman. The merit expressed by 
pu۬yam results in the old conception of a world in heaven, which has nothing to 
do with the karma doctrine of the Upaniৢads. The demerit (pƗpam) may result in 
a stay in hell. There is no reference to mok܈a.  
21  See BODEWITZ, 1996: 34. 
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This mok܈a can be obtained according to Mu৆ঌU 3, 1, 3 by shaking off 
(vidhǌya) good and evil, merit and demerit (pu۬yam and pƗpam). This more 
advanced view about the relative value of pu۬yam is already found in KauৢU 1, 
4 (tad suk܀tadu܈k܀te dhunute), which shows that pu۬yam and pƗpam continue 
the opposition of suk܀tam and du܈k܀tam. Even in a BrƗhma৆a text like the JB we 
find in 1, 18 and 1, 50 that not only demerits but also merits are given up. JB 1, 
50 states that the deceased says to his Pit৚s: yat kiۦ ca pu۬yam akaraۦ tad 
yu܈mƗkam and then these Pit৚s receive his sƗdhuk܀tyƗ (= pu۬yam) and his 
enemies his pƗpak܀tyƗ (apparently = pƗpam).  
So the opposition of pu۬yam and pƗpam with moral implications was not 
first created by the Upaniৢads in connection with the introduction of the karma 
doctrine of transmigration. The world of merits (suk܀taloka) has a parallel in the 
world of the pu۬yak܀t’s in the Upaniৢads, in which, however, just as in some late 
BrƗhma৆a passages the ideas about rebirth on earth and release from trans-
migration became developed in Vedism. 
2.2 The loka obtained by pu৆yam 
In his publication on world and heaven in the Veda GONDA, 1966: 104, rightly 
observes that the term loka does not always denote a world (in heaven) but may 
also mean “position, situation, state, status” and in this connection refers to ChU 
8, 1, 6 tad yatheha karmajito lokaۊ k܈Ưyate evam evƗmutra pu۬yajito lokaۊ 
k܈Ưyate. It is clear that at least one of the two lokas here refers to a particular 
position and probably both, since loka here concerns one person and not a 
group.22  
Such a loka is evidently obtained by doing pu۬yam. See e.g. TB 3, 3, 10, 2 
pu۬yaۦ karma suk܀tasya lokaۊ; JUB 1, 5, 1 yo ha vai pu۬yak܀t syƗt sa iheyƗt; 
PrU 3, 7 udƗnaۊ pu۬yena pu۬yaۦ lokaۦ nayati. Now it is remarkable that not 
only the meritorious actions undertaken on earth are called pu۬ya but that the 
resulting loka in heaven is also called pu۬ya. The compounds pu۬yaloka and 
22  However, Gonda’s interpretation of the text does not convince in all respects. He observes 
that “the good fruits of karman, whether they are gathered in this life or in the other world 
are not inexhaustible”. The gathering of the results of both activities takes place in one and 
the same world, namely on earth, but the fruits are enjoyed in two different worlds. The 
karmajita loka is the powerful position on earth obtained by profane or normal activities 
(karmajita has nothing to do with the karma doctrine), whereas the pu۬yajita loka is enjoyed 
in heaven but obtained on earth by particular merits (pu۬yam). 
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pƗpaloka are misinterpreted by GONDA, 1966: 53, who translates pƗpalokas in 
AV 12, 5, 64 with “‘worlds’ of evil (or, rather, ‘of demerit’)” and assumes a 
KarmadhƗraya noun pu۬yalokam in PrU 3, 7 which does not exist and is based 
on a wrong reading instead of pu۬yaۦ lokam23. The compound pƗpaloka is like-
wise interpreted by GRIFFITH, 1895–1896, as a Tatpuruৢa (“the worlds of sin”), 
whereas WHITNEY, 1905, assumes a KarmadhƗraya (“the evil worlds”). The 
very few occurrences of the noun pƗpaloka do not support the interpretation of a 
Tatpuruৢa. 
The compound pu۬yaloka, which likewise is not current, is an adjective 
meaning “whose loka is pu۬ya”. See PB 12, 11, 12 svargyaۦ vƗ etat sƗma 
svargalokaۊ pu۬yaloko bhavaty aur۬Ɨyavena tu܈ܒuvƗnaۊ “Conducive to the 
attainment of heaven is this sƗman; he who applies in lauding the aur৆Ɨyava      
(-sƗman) shares the world of heaven, the world of bliss” (tr. CALAND, 1931).24 
The term pu۬ya here is an adjective. See also ĝB 3, 6, 2, 15 pu۬yáloka ƯjƗná iti 
“He who has sacrificed shares in the world of bliss” (tr. EGGELING, 1885, which 
apparently was followed by Caland in PB 12, 11, 12). In ĝB 2, 2, 3, 6 the 
adjective pu۬yaloka is turned into a noun by the suffix -tva (occurring in the 
instrumental -tvƗ instead of -tvena): sá jyótir evèhá ĞriyƗ´ yáĞasƗ bhavati jyótir 
amútra pu۬yalokatvƗ´ “and – the latter becomes a light of prosperity and glory in 
this, and a light of bliss in yonder, world” (tr. EGGELING, 1882). Some hesita-
tions about the reading pu۬yalokatvƗ´ and its interpretation have been ex-
pressed25, but it is quite clear that ihá and amútra as well as the two instru-
mentals ĞriyƗ´ and yáĞasƗ (prosperity and renown on earth) and pu۬yalokatvƗ´ 
(the fact that one has become someone whose loka in heaven is pu۬ya) correctly 
sketch the situation of a successful sacrificer. 
The three places treated above in which a person is called pu۬yaloka 
(“whose loka is pu۬ya”), deal with a destination based on a merit (pu۬yam) 
23  This misreading is also found with RADHAKRISHNAN, 1953, who translates pu۬yena pu۬ya-
lokaۦ nayati pƗpena pƗpam with “leads, in consequence of good (work) to the good world, 
in consequence of evil to the evil world.” 
24  GONDA, 1966: 81, n. 41, interprets this sentence as “shares the ‘world’ of heaven, the ‘world 
of virtue’ (or ‘holy world’), i.e. the world of merit”, which obscures the exact analysis of the 
compound pu۬yaloka, since it looks like “whose world is the world of pu۬ya, i.e. pu۬yasya 
loka”, whereas in the compound pu۬yaloka the first member is an adjective qualifying loka 
and not a noun forming the equivalent of suk܀tasya. For Gonda’s doubtful interpretation of 
the turn of phrase suk܀tasya loka, in which suk܀ta is not taken as merit in general but too 
exclusively associated with ritual, see p. 115. 
25  See MINDARD, 1949: paragraph 542 b, who mentions the suggested reading pu۬yalokátra 
and observes that of the transmitted “le sens obtenu est médiocre”. 
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which is ritualistic. The situation is different in the following two textplaces 
from the ChU. 
In ChU 2, 23, 1–2 the adjective pu۬yaloka qualifies persons who are not 
exclusively concerned with ritual, but whose way of life is based on the three-
fold dharma (1. sacrifice, study and liberality; 2. austerity; 3. staying permanent-
ly in the house of the teacher). This means that their pu۬yam consists of three 
options and that sacrificing only represents one third of the first of these three 
options. Obtaining such a pu۬ya loka is opposed to the immortality of someone 
who is steadfast in Brahman, i.e. someone who obtains mok܈a. OLIVELLE, 1996: 
116, translates trayo dharmaskandhƗۊ yajño ’dhyƗyanaۦ dƗnam iti prathamas, 
tapa eva dvitƯyo, brahmacƗry ƗcƗryakulavƗsƯ t܀tƯyaۊ […] brahmasaۦ-
stho ’m܀tatvam eti as follows: “There are three types of persons whose torso is 
the Law (dharma). The first is one who pursues sacrifice, vedic recitation, and 
giftgiving. The second is one who is devoted solely to austerity. The third is a 
celibate student of the Veda living at his teacher’s house. […]26. All these gain 
worlds earned by merit27. A person who is steadfast in brahman reaches im-
mortality.” 28  
ChU 5, 10, 10 states Ğuddhaۊ pǌtaۊ pu۬yaloko bhavati ya evaۦ veda and 
the knowledge required for obtaining the pu۬ya loka concerns the doctrine of the 
five fires which together with the doctrine of the two paths describes life after 
death of the human beings. Just as in ChU 2, 23, 1 this pu۬ya loka is not the 
destination of those who become released but is superior to the destination of the 
sinners mentioned in the preceding verse in ChU 5, 10, 9, who patanti, i.e. go to 
hell. The adjective pu۬ya qualifying the loka in the possessive compound pu۬ya-
26  In a probable insertion in the text it is explained that someone who permanently lives with 
his teacher is meant here. 
27  On p. 335 Olivelle leaves open the possibility that “the term pu۬ya, here translated as 
‘earned by merit’ can also mean ‘pure’ or ‘pleasant’” without explaining the difference be-
tween ‘earned by merit’ (referring to a loka) and ‘producing merit’ (referring to a particular 
activity). 
28  In a note on p. 334 Olivelle observes: “My translation of this passage is based on taking 
dharmaskandhƗۊ as a possessive compound (bahuvrƯhi).” Indeed, there is an opposition be-
tween two types of persons, those who win a pu۬ya loka and those who reach immortality, 
but this need not imply that trayo dharmaskandhƗۊ refers to three types of persons who 
follow dharma. The third category is expressed with a noun denoting a person (brahma-
cƗrin), but the first and the second categories are institutions. Here Olivelle’s translation 
changes these into types of persons, which is grammatically untenable. However, the com-
pound pu۬yalokƗs should be taken as denoting the persons involved in the mentioned three 
institutions, the three divisions of religious merits. 
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loka has been variously translated in this connection.29 This adjective does not 
only occur in the compound pu۬yaloka but is also found as a separate adjective 
qualifying loka. 
The goat which is offered and goes to heaven is addressed in AV 9, 5, 16 
with […] tváyƗ lokám á۪girasaۊ pr‚ƗjƗnan taۦ lokáۦ pú۬yaۦ prá jñe܈am “[…] 
by thee the Aৄgirases foreknew [their] world; that pure (pú۬ya) world would I 
fain foreknow” (tr. WHITNEY, 1905). The translation “pure” of pú۬ya (probably 
based on an etymology) does not convince, since evidently pu۬ya here refers to 
the human activities (in this case the organizing of a sacrifice), as also appears 
from 9, 5, 1, where the world which will be reached by the goat is called the 
suk ´܀tƗۦ loká (translated by Whitney as “the world of the well-doing”). The 
translation of pú۬ya by GRIFFITH, 1895–1896, is “holy”, but GONDA, 1966: 135, 
n. 21) correctly observes that the person praying desires to have foreknowledge 
which refers “to the ‘world to come’ […] to the ‘world of merit’ awaiting 
him.”30 However, the pú۬ya loká’s obtained by giving hospitality to a VrƗtya in 
AV 15, 13, 1 ff. are translated as “pure (holy: pu۬yƗۊ)” by GONDA, 1966: 57. 
The translators of the AV render pú۬ya occurring in AV 19, 54, 4, which 
qualifies a plural lokƗۊ, with “pure” or “holy”, but GONDA, 1966: 149, observes 
that the commentary here explains “pu۬yƗn lokƗn as pu۬yakarmabhir arjitƗn 
lokƗn ‘the “worlds” acquired by meritorious (good, virtuous, pure) deeds’.” 
GONDA, 1966: 81, explains his interpretation of PB 18.3.4 of pu۬ya loka 
translated as “holy world” in his note 41, in which he refers to PB 12, 11, 12 
where pu۬yaloka is translated as someone who “shares the ‘world’ of heaven, 
29  See the following renderings of the compound in ChU 2, 23, 1 and 5, 10, 10: DEUSSEN, 1897, 
“bringen als Lohn heiligen Welten” and “bleibt er […] in der Welt der Reinen”; HUME, 1931, 
“become possessors of meritorious worlds” and “becomes possessor of a pure world”; 
SENART, 1930, “mènent aux séjours purs” and “il est […] digne du monde des bienheureux”; 
RADHAKRISHNAN, 1953, “these attain to the worlds of the virtuous” and “he […] obtains a 
virtuous world”; GONDA, 1966, “they gain access to the lokas of merit”; OLIVELLE, 1996, 
“these gain worlds earned by merit” and “attains a good world”. The adjective means holy, 
pure, meritorious, fortunate, good and virtuous. Most translators assume a relation between 
virtues and merits and the obtained loka’s, but are not very consistent in their renderings. 
The merit by which in ChU 5, 10, 10 the future loka is earned, seems to be based on a par-
ticular knowledge, but since the obtained stay in heaven is limited, we may connect the 
people concerned with those mentioned in 5, 10, 3, who offer to the gods, give fees to the 
priests and perform charity. So merits (pu۬yam) here is represented by ritual and doing good.  
30  On p. 141 in note 47 Gonda deals with the parallel of this verse in VS. 20, 25 and 26 and 
then translates lokáۦ pú۬yam as “pure or holy ‘world’”. 
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the ‘world of virtue’ (or ‘holy world’), i.e. the world of merit”31. Gonda’s ap-
proach is rather intangible, since he changes his translations time and again and 
sometimes tries to show that they mean the same.32 See his treatment of MuU 1, 
2, 6 (1966: 122; 130–131), in which, on the one hand, he translates e܈a vaۊ 
pu۬yas suk܀to brahmalokaۊ as “this is your holy loka-which-is-oneness-with-
brahman, prepared by your merit” (p. 130), on the other hand as “this is your 
pure (‘holy’, and meritorious) world of brahman, well made, i.e. gained by well 
performed deeds” (p. 131) and “This is your holy (or meritorious, pu۬yaۊ) world 
of brahma, (‘well made’, i.e.) fashioned (prepared, gained) by merits (suk܀taۊ)” 
(p. 122).33  
In PB 19, 10, 4 and 19, 11, 8 someone who has a particular knowledge 
about a Stoma called Pakৢin (“having wings”) pu۬yƗn lokƗn (i.e. worlds or 
positions in heaven) sañcarati, which CALAND, 1931, translates as “Winged […] 
he […] frequents the pure worlds.” I would prefer to interpret sañ-car as “to 
come into contact with, to reach” and doubt whether these worlds, to which one 
can fly with wings obtained with knowledge about the winged Stoma, are pure. 
By one’s merit obtained through a particular ritualistic knowledge one reaches 
worlds which are associated with merits. 
In the Upaniৢads the adjective pu۬ya qualifies loka not only in MuU 1, 2, 6 
(see above), but also in PrU 3, 7, where reaching a pu۬ya loka depends on the 
merit (pu۬yena) obtained on earth. This agrees with ChU 8, 1, 16, where such a 
loka is not called pu۬ya but pu۬yajita, which supports the assumption that the 
adjective pu۬ya which qualifies a loka does not mean ‘holy’ or ‘pure’ but means 
‘based on, or acquired with, merits’. The nature of these merits depends on the 
contexts, but there is no reason to assume that the merits mentioned in the 
31  See n. 24. 
32  See his publication on loka (1966: 108), where the pu۬ya world is, on the one hand, trans-
lated as “holy”, on the other hand, explained as “won by good deeds (MuU 1, 2, 6) or ritual 
methods (TB 3, 1, 5, 6; PU. 5, 5)”, an observation which is followed by a note (8) referring 
to ch. XI. in which mainly the interpretation of merits is associated with the correct perfor-
mance of the ritual. 
33  It is evident that here pu۬ya is more or less identical with suk܀ta and means ‘produced by 
merits’, that it does not mean ‘holy’ or ‘pure’ and that suk܀ta has no associations with a cor-
rect performance. OLIVELLE, 1996, interprets MuU 1, 2, 6 as “built by good deeds and rites 
well done”. His translation of pu۬ya is correct, but of suk܀ta untenable, since suk܀ta does not 
exclusively refer to rituals, let alone to the correctness of their performance. 
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ritualistic texts were exclusively obtained by rituals whereas in later and non-
ritualistic texts all kinds of merits became mixed up for the first time.34 
2.3 The persons who are called pu৆ya 
Even gods may be called pu۬ya. See ĝB 4, 5, 4, 1, where it is said that originally 
all the gods were the same and pu۬ya, translated with “good” by EGGELING, 
1885. Since later they wanted to become superior to each other, this being pu۬ya 
seems to refer to merits or qualities35. In this case the merit has not been ob-
tained in a former life on earth. 
The group of the pu۬yajana’s is first mentioned in the AV 8, 8, 15 and 11, 
9, 24 as some sort of semi-divine beings together with Gandharvas, Apsarases, 
Devas, serpents and Pit৚s. They are translated with “Holy Men” and “Holy 
Beings” by GRIFFITH, 1895–1896, with “pure-folks” by WHITNEY, 1905, with 
“holy men” and “pious men” by BLOOMFIELD, 1897. The last mentioned scholar 
observes in a note (on p. 585) that “the pu۬yajanƗ´ۊ are the suk ´܀taۊ, ‘pious 
deceased’”, which is correct. These semi-divine or divinized human beings have 
a position below the gods and above the Pit৚s.36  
The human beings who will become members of the group of pu۬yajana’s 
are called pu۬ya because they are pu۬yak܀t’s (‘doers of pu۬ya, producers of 
merit’) and therefore need not be called ‘pure’ or ‘holy’. The nature of their 
being pu۬ya depends on the nature of their pu۬ya activities or behaviour.  
As qualification of human beings pu۬ya does not often occur. Sometimes it 
does not mean ‘meritorious’ (let alone ‘pure’ or ‘holy’). See PB 11, 5, 11 (treated 
above in section II.1), where it means ‘prosperous’. See also PB 18, 8, 66 ƗtmanƗ 
vƗ agni܈ܒomena ‘rdhnoty ƗtmanƗ pu۬yo bhavati, which CALAND, 1931, trans-
lates as “He himself (the Sacrificer) thrives through the agniৢ৬oma, he himself 
gets spiritual merits”. This rendering may be correct, but the thriving of the 
sacrificer (the king) may also be connected with his becoming pu۬ya. In PB 18, 
9, 21 the pu۬ya king who is called ‘full of sweet milk’, may be pu۬ya on account 
34  See GONDA, 1966: 150, n. 3: “Outside the ritualist circles no fundamental difference is made 
between the sources or origins of merit.” 
35  OLDENBERG, 1919: 21, n. 2, rejects Eggeling’s translation and prefers “glückvoll”. 
36  For such a group of which the name ends in -janƗs, see BODEWITZ, 1973: 97 f., n. 23, where 
it is shown that the Devas may also occur as the Devajanas just like the Sarpas as the Sarpa-
janas. Such Janas form a group without individuals discerned by names.  
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of his liberality in giving sacrificial fees (like cattle), but pu۬ya may also in-
dicate that he is able to do so, i.e. that he is prosperous. 
According to TS 1, 6, 11, 4 someone whom PrajƗpati knows becomes pu۬ya, 
translated with “pure” by KEITH, 1914. However, in this context the sacrifice is 
described as a cow to be milked. Therefore prosperity rather than purity seems to 
play a role here. In TS 7, 2, 7, 3 the most significant terms in the translation of 
KEITH, 1914, are “prosperity”, “becoming worse”, and “misfortune” and then we 
find at the end “whose father and grandfather are holy, and who yet does not 
possess holiness”. It is evident that pu۬ya here has nothing to do with being 
holy, but refers to prosperity. 
This does not imply that everywhere pu۬ya should mean ‘prosperous’, but 
it may imply that holiness and purity are not essential in the meaning of pu۬ya, 
which seems to refer to every kind of good investment including merits which 
have good results in a life after death.  
Two textplaces in the BƖU show that one becomes pu۬ya by pu۬yena 
karma۬Ɨ (3, 2, 13 and 4, 4, 5). On the one hand, it is clear that becoming holy by 
a holy deed hardly suits the information on people being or becoming pu۬ya. On 
the other hand, becoming prosperous by prosperous activities is rather trivial. 
The correlation between pu۬ya karman and becoming pu۬ya here evidently is 
based on the doctrine of karma and refers to the nature of the rebirth on earth 
rather than to the merits obtained for a continuation of life in a pu۬yaloka in 
heaven. 
In a verse quoted by ĝB 13, 5, 4, 3 the PƗrikৢitas are said to have overcome 
their kárma pƗ´pakam by means of pú۬yena kárma۬Ɨ. These PƗrikৢitas are said 
to be yájamƗnƗ aĞvamedhaíۊ and to be pú۬yƗۊ. EGGELING, 1900, translates: 
“The righteous PƗrikৢitas, performing horse-sacrifices, by their righteous work 
did away with sinful work”, whereas HORSCH, 1966: 140, takes pú۬yƗۊ with 
pú۬yena kármanƗ 37  and renders: “Die opfernden Nachkommen des Parikৢit 
überwanden mit Pferdeopfern die böse Tat […], als Fromme mit frommer Tat”. 
The meaning of pu۬ya which denotes persons (i.e. YajamƗnas) as well as their 
meritorious activities (i.e. the sacrifices organized by them) here refers to items 
which procure or have obtained merits and may be compared with suk܀t and 
suk܀tam, whereas renderings like “righteous” and “fromm” start from the per-
sons involved. The fact that the sacrificers who become pu۬ya by their activities 
37  He refers to BƖU 3, 2, 13 pu۬yo vai pu۬yena karma۬Ɨ, but there the pu۬ya karman is the 
cause of becoming pu۬ya, whereas here this is less clear and the instrumental may be taken 
as an apposition with aĞvamedhaíۊ. 
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which are pu۬ya and qualify them for becoming pu۬ya in heaven here are al-
ready called pu۬ya on earth, is not surprising, since in this verse the karma 
doctrine rather than the winning of a loka in heaven forms the central theme. 
We may conclude that the adjective pu۬ya qualifying human beings refers 
to their merits. The nature of these merits still forms a problem. 
2.4 What is the pu৆yam done by the meritorious? 
Often pu۬yam is associated with derivations of the root kar (e.g. pu۬yak܀t and 
pu۬yaۦ karma) and then a ritualistic meaning has been assumed. This may be 
correct and even to be expected in ritual texts, but sometimes this is uncertain. 
Moreover associations with other verbs than kar play a role in other texts. 
In JB 1, 97 (see section I.2) pu۬yaۦ jƯv denotes good behaviour in life and 
perhaps is specified with the directly following instrumentals i܈ܒƗpǌrtena tapasƗ 
suk܀tena, which would imply that apart from rituals also the giving of presents 
or fees (and perhaps of hospitality) and asceticism are pu۬yam. The pu۬yam 
which one has done on earth and which is given to the Pit৚s in JB 1, 50 is also 
called sƗdhuk܀tyƗ and opposed to the pƗpak܀tyƗ given to one’s enemies and 
obviously refers to doing good in general38, unfortunately left unspecified. 
AV 15, 13, 1 ff. promises pu۬ya loka’s to someone who receives a VrƗtya in 
his house. Since the pu۬ya loka’s are obtained by pu۬yam done on earth, we have 
to conclude that hospitality is a possible pu۬yam.  
In ChU 2, 23, 1 besides sacrifice other items qualifying for obtaining a 
pu۬yaloka are mentioned, i.a. liberality (dƗnam) and asceticism (tapas)39. 
The pu۬yaۦ karma may be a sacrifice40, but other activities may also be 
denoted here. See BƖU 3, 2, 13 and 4, 4, 5, where the opposition between pu۬ya 
and pƗpa more or less excludes the meaning sacrifice for karman, since bad 
sacrifices are not to be assumed here.41 In BƖU 1, 4, 15 the treated pu۬yaۦ karma 
38  See n. 7. 
39  See n. 29, where also ChU 5, 10, 10 has been treated. 
40  See ĝB 13, 5, 4, 3 discussed in section 2.3, where a pu۬yaۦ karma in the form of a sacrifice 
destroys the karman which is called bad. Here the one singular refers to a specific rite and 
the other to the activity in general of the karma doctrine, but the two aspects become more 
or less mixed up. 
41  See section 2.1. In BƖU 4, 4, 5 the context (i.c. 4, 4, 6) makes it definitely clear that the kar-
man doctrine is meant, since the text states that after having reached the end of this karma, 
i.e. of the results of whatever he has done in this world, he returns back from yonder world. 
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is called mahat and some translators misinterpret this passages and take mahat 
pu۬yaۦ karma as a great and holy work or rite.42 Evidently the karman treated 
here is not a sacrifice but the technical term used for expressing the merits or 
demerits collected by a human beings. The singular does not refer to a single act 
let alone to a ritual and the verb kar does not mean here ‘to perform’ but ‘to 
produce’. Even if one has produced, i.e. collected, an enormous (mahat), posi-
tive or meritorious (pu۬yam) amount of karma, this will become exhausted at the 
end.  
On the other hand sometimes pu۬yaۦ karma can only refer to rituals. See 
AƖ 2, 1, 7, where the moon produces the bright and the dark halves of the moon 
pu۬yƗya karma۬e (i.e. for the halfmonthly rituals) and the waters give ĞraddhƗۦ 
[…] pu۬yƗya karma۬e (i.e. the longing for organizing a meritorious act in the 
form of a sacrifice).43 See also 2, 5, 1, where the son is born as the father’s se-
cond birth pu۬yebhyaۊ karmabhyaۊ (for rituals which accumulate merits for him 
in yonder world).  
In post-Vedic texts the adjective pu۬yakarman often has nothing to do with 
rituals and denotes somebody whose behaviour is meritorious or virtuous. That 
doing pu۬ya(m) can mean ‘doing good’ in the sense of hospitality, liberality or 
charity appears from the post-Vedic compounds pu۬yag܀ha and pu۬yaĞƗlƗ 
which denote ‘a house of charity’.44  
So pu۬yam means meritorious work such as sacrifices, hospitality, charity. 
Merits (rather than morality) play an essential role, since the aim of pu۬yam is 
obtaining a particular position, especially in life after death. As an adjective 
________________________________ 
OLIVELLE, 1996, translates “Reaching the end of this action”, but the singular karman here 
does not denote an action but refers to the result of all one’s actions stored in heaven. 
42  See e.g. RADHAKRISHNAN, 1953: “Even if one performs a great and holy work, but without 
knowing this, that work of his is exhausted in the end”, and OLIVELLE, 1996: “If a man who 
does not know this performs even a grand and holy rite, it is sure to fade away after his 
death”. 
43  KEITH, 1909, translates with “for good deeds”, rightly observes in a note that probably this 
refers to sacrificial acts, but misinterprets ĞraddhƗ as “faith”. 
44  Compare dharmaĞƗlƗ “charitable asylum, hospital, esp. religious asylum” (tr. in MONIER-
WILLIAMS’ dictionary 1899). These compounds show that charity was associated with virtue, 
duty, merits and religion and that expenses made by the rich in the sphere of charity con-
tinued to be meritorious since Vedic times, in which ChU 4, 1, 1 illustrates this liberality 
and charity by referring to king JƗnaĞruti, who was ĞraddhƗdeyo bahudƗyƯ bahupƗkyaۊ 
(“totally devoted to giving and used to give a lot, a man who gave a lot of cooked food”) and 
who sarvata ƗvasathƗn mƗpayƗۦ cakre sarvata eva me ’tsyantƯti (“had hospices built 
everywhere, thinking ‘People will eat food from me everywhere.’”, tr. OLIVELLE, 1996).  
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pu۬ya qualifies the activities which produce merits as well as the persons who 
carry them out and therefore deserve their rewards. As a qualification of these 
rewards (in the form of a particular world or position in heaven) the adjective 
pu۬ya may be interpreted as ‘deserved’ or as ‘good’. 
3. What are the qualifications for life after death in heaven? 
In the preceding sections and subsections I have discussed two general terms 
denoting virtue or merit, suk܀tam and pu۬yam. It appeared that these two terms 
were especially used to denote general qualifications for life after death in hea-
ven, at least in the oldest stages of Vedic literature. Both terms were associated 
with the meritorious survivors after death in special, heavenly worlds. This means 
that merits rather than moral virtues played a role in the discussed contexts. 
Moreover in many cases the worlds of the meritorious people were almost 
exclusively reserved for those who had organized sacrifices. The merit consisted 
of sacrifices and accompanying liberality in the form of Dakৢi৆Ɨs.  
However, liberality in general and hospitality which is not confined to 
special persons like Brahmins, might (unlike the sacrifice and its fees45) have a 
moral connotation. They were the moral merits in which doing good or well-
doing could be interpreted as virtues. 
The entrance to heaven, however, was not restricted to human beings who 
were distinguished by meritorious activities like organizing sacrifices, giving 
sacrificial fees, liberality in general and hospitality, i.e. spending one’s property 
on behalf of gods, Brahmins or even human beings in general. There were also 
other categories of candidates, as we will see.  
In the oldest Vedic text, the ৙gveda SaীhitƗ, life after death was not men-
tioned in its oldest layers.46 The discovery of heaven for and by human beings 
took place in the course of the development of this text. So we shall first 
examine the data of this oldest text and what has been written on this topic by 
modern scholars. 
45  JOLLY, 1896: 104, observed: “[S]chon in der vedischen Literatur spielt der Opferlohn (dak܈i۬Ɨ) 
wie überhaupt die Beschenkung der Brahmanen eine grosse Rolle. Je wertvoller das Ge-
schenk, desto schöner der Himmelslohn.” 
46  See BODEWITZ, 1994. 
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3.1 Obtaining heaven in the ۿgvedasaۦhitƗ 
In his history of Vedic religion, OLDENBERG, 1917: 512, observed: “An den nicht 
gerade häufigen Stellen, an denen im Veda […] vom Jenseits die Rede ist, steht 
bedenklich im Vorgrund das Motiv vom Himmelslohn dessen, der den Priestern 
reichlich spendet.” We do not find much information on moral or ethical qualifi-
cations for life after death in heaven from the oldest Vedic text in this public-
cation. See p. 5: “Von den Abgründen der Not und Schuld weiss diese Poesie 
wenig.” In his comparable handbook, KEITH, 1925: 409, remarked: “The idea of 
judgement of any sort is foreign to the Rigveda as to early Iran.” GONDA, 1960, 
hardly dealt with the qualifications for reaching heaven according to the oldest 
text in his handbook on Vedic religion. On p. 41 he observes: “Diese gegensei-
tige Abhängigkeit von Menschen und Devas, […] diese wesentlich amoralische, 
auf einem Austausch von Diensten beruhende Beziehung ist eines der wichtig-
sten Fundamente der altindischen ‘Religiosität’.”47 As we have seen above, his 
treatment of this topic in his study on loka (1966) was almost exclusively limited 
to the ritual merits qualifying for life in heaven especially as far as the oldest 
Vedic texts are concerned. 
In his handbook on the religious system of the ৙gveda, OBERLIES, 1998: 
464–487, treats “Die ৚gvedischen Jenseitsvorstellungen” in an excursion of his 
interpretation of the Somarausch. On p. 467 f. he observes: “Wenn […] von einer 
(erfreulichen) postmortalen Existenz im Himmel gesprochen wird, wird die Er-
langung zumeist in unmittelbaren Zusammenhang mit dem Vollzug von Opfern 
und/oder dem Trinken des Soma gestellt.” However, there is a rather great 
difference between the organizing of a Soma sacrifice for the gods and the 
becoming intoxicated by drinking oneself the Soma. Indeed, Soma represents 
one of the regular offerings given to the gods and drunk by (i.a.) the priests, but 
in connection with immortality in heaven for the human beings it is only ex-
ceptionally mentioned in the oldest Vedic text. The only hymn extensively treated 
by Oberlies (8, 48) is found on the pages 449–454 (preceding the mentioned 
excursion) and 493–497 (following this excursion on the “Somarausch”). Here 
the drinking of Soma does not have the function of an offering qualifying the 
sacrificer for heaven, but it gives a preview of life in heaven by producing 
visions48 or hallucinations. 
47  GELDNER, 1951, writes in a note on 4, 24, 9: “Das Verhältnis zwischen Gott und Sterblichen 
wird öfter als ein Handelsgeschäft dargestellt.” 
48  See BODEWITZ, 1991: 19. 
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Such visions may be explained in the context of mysticism, if their contents 
refer to a central concept of their religion. Light and the sun are the central aims 
which one wants to obtain in this hymn after drinking Soma. KUIPER, 1983: 56–
89, in the reprint of an article originally published in I-IJ 8 (1964), p. 96–129, 
treated the association of light and sun with life after death and with the concept 
of ৙ta (“cosmic order”) in the Vedic religion and its Old Iranian counterpart and 
tried to show that these items belong to old Aryan common ideas on mysticism. I 
quote: “Irrespective of whether, in a visionary state of mind, the poet here 
aspires to see the bliss of the blessed dead or rather prays for a place in the 
‘immortal world’ in afterlife, this much is clear that this is the traditional picture 
of the blissful life in Yama’s realm” (1983: 82, commenting on ৙V 9, 113, 7–
11); “This Old Aryan mysticism is also directly reflected in Zarathustra’s 
phraseology” (p. 86); “It is hoped […] that the preceding remarks are sufficient 
for proving that, when Zarathustra professes that he will speak of ‘the bliss of 
Aša which manifests itself together with the lights’ he is using the traditional 
terminology of Aryan mysticism” (p. 87). As has been correctly observed by 
OBERLIES, 1998; 463, n. 52, unfortunately he hardly pays attention to the role of 
the “Soma-Rausch”. It is clear that the drinking of Soma by some persons may 
have influenced mysticism concentrated on light and the ৙ta (cosmic order) in 
life after death49. 
The ৙ta is also mentioned in ৙V 10, 154 together with some other terms 
which refer to qualifications for life after death in heaven. GELDNER, 1951, 
translates ܀ta with “Wahrheit” in 10, 154, 4, but in a note observes that this verse 
refers to the ascetics, since it also mentions tapas. Probably the ৙ta has to be 
interpreted in the context of mysticism, as was done above.50  
This hymn mentions several types of human beings who have reached hea-
ven through merits or virtues: brave warriors, liberal patrons, ascetics, mystics. 
On the one hand we find men in the world who bravely fight or give rich 
Dakৢi৆Ɨs at a sacrifice, on the other hand people who perform asceticism and 
have mystic experiences with the ৙ta (cosmic order) in heaven. The first cate-
gory wins its aim by the virtue of braveness which looks like Plato’s cardinal 
virtue andria (see n.1) and by the merit of liberality in the sacrificial sphere 
which was well-known as a pu۬yam or suk܀tam, and the second temporarily tries 
49  The fact that references to life after death are missing in the oldest layers of the ৙V and that 
in later layers Old Iranian parallels for the described mysticism are assumed, might look 
strange. However, one may start from the assumption that this mysticism belongs to other 
circles than those represented in the oldest, ritualistic books.  
50  See also BODEWITZ, 1994: 36. 
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to place itself outside the sphere of life on earth by ascetic exercises or the drink-
ing of Soma (not explicitly indicated as such in this hymn). Since tapas and 
Soma also play a role in the ritual, it is uncertain whether different groups of 
Vedic human beings are meant in this hymn. Anyhow it is evident that ৙tam 
here does not refer to the moral virtue of speaking the truth and that tapas is not 
a regular species of suk܀tam or pu۬yam.51 
The traditional association of immortality with merits like hospitality or 
liberality is incidentally found in layers of the ৙gveda which do not belong to 
the latest. See 1, 31, 15 and 1, 125, 5 and Bodewitz (1994: 33). In 1, 154, 5, one 
wants to reach heaven where human beings who love the gods are staying. This 
rather vague qualification (devayú) probably refers to pious ritualists. 
In 1, 164 (an admittedly rather late hymn in this early layer) we find some 
different references to qualifications for immortality in heaven (see BODEWITZ, 
1994: 34). Though some verses (23; 30; 33) in this riddle hymn full of enigmas 
contain references to immortality and the soul and seem to refer to visionary 
experiences, knowledge and philosophy, the hymn is evidently connected with 
ritual or even one specific ritual.52 This makes its interpretation difficult in as far 
as the qualification for life after death in heaven is concerned. 
There are some hymns in the late tenth book in which immortality in hea-
ven is mentioned. However, apart from 10, 154 (see above) hardly any hymn re-
fers to other qualifications for immortality than the merits of sacrifice, giving 
Dakৢi৆Ɨs and other forms of liberality. Morals and mysticism do not play an im-
portant role in this connection. 
3.2 Qualifications for heaven in the AtharvavedasaۦhitƗ 
In a publication on life after death in the AtharvavedasaীhitƗ (BODEWITZ, 
1999a), I observed (on p. 117, n. 20): 
It is remarkable that those portions of the AtharvavedasaۦhitƗ which resemble the older 
layers of the ৙V and make a Ğrauta impresssion, hardly show traces of life after death in 
heaven. Just as in the ৙V heaven is indicated as suk܀tásya/suk܀tƗۦ loká […]. However, in 
the ৙V we find this designation of heaven only in the 10th book and no more than once or 
51  However, in some Vedic prose texts tapas seems to be on a line with other forms of pu۬yam. 
In JB 1, 97 (see sections I.2 and II.4) it may even be a specification of pu۬yam. In ChU 2, 23, 
1 (see section 2.2) tapas does not belong to the same group as sacrifice and liberality, but it 
still qualifies for a pu۬yaloka and therefore may be regarded as pu۬yam itself.  
52  See HOUBEN, 2000. 
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twice, whereas in the AV just as in some BrƗhma৆as the world of merit or of the meritorious 
is frequently mentioned. […] winning the world of merit in the AV is reserved for people 
who organize very simple rituals with emphasis on liberality towards the Brahmins. 
The qualification for heaven may also be inferred from the disqualification based 
on sins and their punishment. In five text places (AV 5, 18, 13; 5, 19, 3; 12, 4, 3; 
12, 4, 36; 12, 5, 64), disrespectful behaviour towards Brahmins plays a role. See 
o.c., p.109 f. and p. 117, n. 9. The qualification for heaven forms its correspond-
ing counterpart. 
Actually, in almost all the hymns in which life after death in heaven plays a role, items are 
given to Brahmins or deposited in or with them by way of oblation. […] We are in the 
sphere of the g܀hya or the specific Atharvavedic ritual in which the Brahmins more or less 
replace the gods. (o.c., p. 114) 
The merits have nothing to do with moral virtues. 
3.3 How is heaven to be obtained in Vedic prose texts? 
Since the mantras of the Yajurvedic SaীhitƗs do not give much additional infor-
mation, I will now concentrate on the pre-Upaniৢadic ritual prose texts (and also 
treat some Upaniৢadic parallels). As is to be expected, these texts mainly deal 
with reaching heaven by means of sacrifices. Incidentally, we find references to 
moral issues. See e.g. TB 3, 3, 7, 10, where in a context which several times 
mentions reaching heaven, the opposition of ܀jukarmám (sic), satyám, súcaritam 
and v܀jinám, an܀tám, dúĞcaritam is found, be it not explicitly as a qualification 
for immortality in heaven. These virtues are honesty in speech and action. Here 
ethics evidently play a role. However, such information is rather scarce in the 
ritualistic BrƗhma৆a texts.  
In 3, 12, 9, 7–8 of the same text it is said that a Brahmin who knows the 
Ɩtman does not become polluted by evil karman. Here neither ethics or morals 
nor sacrificial merits play a role, but only knowledge, especially concerning the 
Ɩtman, and we are in the sphere of the Upaniৢads, in which the doctrine of 
karma is associated with aims about liberation. 
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In the BrƗhma৆as we expect the earliest enumerations of virtues or merits 
corresponding to similar enumerations of sins or even cardinal sins.53 Indeed 
some enumerations (without much comment) are found. 
TB 3, 12, 8, 5 mentions together satyam, ĞraddhƗ, tapas and dama.  
In TƖ 7 (= TU 1) we find the following enumeration of duties: ܀tam, satyam, 
tapas, dama, Ğama, agnayas, agnihotram, atithayas, mƗnu܈am (?), prajƗ, prajana 
(?), prajƗti (TU 1, 9). To each of these 12 items the text adds svƗdhyƗya and 
pravacanam and then concludes this passage by quoting three authorities of 
whom the one prefers only satyam, the other only tapas and the third only 
svƗdhyƗya and pravacanam, because these items would be equal to tapas. The 
twelvefold enumeration seems to consist of the duties for three types of men: the 
first five items concern the ascetic type, the next four perhaps the ritualist, whose 
merits also consist of hospitality, the last three the simple householder. I assume 
that we should read prajananam instead of prajanas and mƗnasam instead of 
mƗnu܈am. The addition of svƗdhyƗya and pravacanam means that perhaps gene-
ral duties and not those of separate phases of life are treated here. This emphasis 
on study and teaching suits the context of TU 1. Further on, in 1, 11, the pupil 
who is leaving his teacher, is urged to dedicate his attention to satyam, dharma, 
svƗdhyƗya, prajƗ, kuĞalam, bhǌti, svƗdhyƗya and pravacanam, devakƗryam and 
pit܀kƗryam. This enumeration, in which tapas, dama and Ğama are missing, 
seems to be limited to the duties of the householder. 
In an other Upaniৢad of the TƖ (TƖ 10 = MNU) an enumeration similar to 
the one of TU 1, 9 is found: tapas, satyam, dama, Ğama, dƗnam, dharma, praja-
nanam, agnayas, agnihotram, yajña, mƗnasam, nyƗsa (MNU 505–516, ed. VA-
RENNE, 1960). Again 12 items, but here the last is explicitly said to be the most 
important, which might mean that saۦnyƗsa here (but not in the whole text of 
this Upaniৢad) is the main subject.54 MNU 196–197 equates all the items of the 
following series ܀tam, satyam, Ğrutam, ĞƗntam, dama, Ğama, dƗnam and yajña 
with tapas, which might indicate a preference for asceticism. These TaittirƯya 
texts, of which the MNU is the latest, show an increasing interest in asceticism 
and austerity, though the traditional merits of sacrifice and liberality receive 
some attention. Explicitly or implicitly all these approaches qualify for immor-
tality in heaven, but the latest passages tend to have a special interest in mok܈a 
rather than aiming at a continuation of life after death.  
53  For enumerations of these sins see BODEWITZ, 2007a: 324–328.  
54  For the interpretation of this passage see BODEWITZ, 1973: 297 ff. 
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In the Ɩra৆yaka-like JaiminƯya text JUB 4, 25, 3 the three items satyam, 
Ğama and dama, which are also found above in the TaittirƯya texts, occur to-
gether: vedo brahma tasya satyam Ɨyatanaۦ Ğamaۊ prati܈ܒhƗ damaĞ ca, trans-
lated by OERTEL, 1894, as “The Veda is the brahman, truth is its abode, tran-
quility and restraint its foundation.” In its Upaniৢad, KenaU 4, 8, this is formu-
lated as follows: tasyai [a genitive referring back to brahmƯm […] upani܈adam, 
the mystic interpretation of the Brahman] tapo damaۊ karmeti prati܈ܒhƗ vedƗs 
sarvƗ۪gƗni satyam Ɨyatanam.  
This partial parallel proves that Oertel was wrong in taking vedas instead of 
brahma as the subject in JUB 4, 25, 3. In the KenaU karman is added to Ğama 
(here replaced by tapas) and dama as one of the three items representing the 
basis55 of the interpretation of Brahman. This interpretation is based on three 
approaches, of which karman here is one, not to be taken as ‘work’ or ‘action’ 
but as ‘ritual’, as was correctly done by OLIVELLE, 1996.56 The term Ɨyatanam 
is mostly interpreted as abode, as was even done by GONDA, 1975: 347, in his 
translation of this sentence, but for a correct interpretation see GONDA, 1975a: 
204: “That means that the doctrine is firmly founded on austerity, etc., and it 
aims at, or leads to, truth which is identical with Brahman.” In the same public-
cation Gonda sometimes takes Ɨyatanam as “destination”. If now the aim or 
destination is Brahman which is satyam at the same time, this concept of satyam 
has nothing to do with a moral or ethical virrtues like speaking the truth (as a 
qualification for immortality in heaven), but rather has to be interpreted as cos-
mic order or reality (satyam = ܀tam). The passage from the KenaU ends (in 4, 9) 
with the conclusion that he who knows thus this (brahmƯ upani܈ad), will become 
established in an endless heavenly world. Knowledge (about Brahman) obtained 
by ascetic practices (tapas and dama) and also based on studying the Veda and 
its ritual here give entrance to heaven and this knowledge is not a merit or a 
moral virtue.57 
The above treated texts form a strange mixture of asceticism and tradi-
tional, partly ritualistic values. Even in an old text like the AB we find a similar 
combination: devƗ vai yajñena Ğrame۬a tapasƗhutibhiۊ svargaۦ lokam ajayaۦs 
(3, 13, 6). It is true that here the gods and not the human beings obtain heaven, 
but these gods simply produce the example to be followed by the human beings. 
55  Mostly prati܈ܒhƗ represents the two feet and is twofold. 
56  See also GONDA, 1975a: 204, who translates with “socio-ritual activity”. 
57  In the late Vedic Upaniৢad MuU 3, 1, 5, knowledge and asceticism are mentioned together 
without ritual (satyam, tapas, saۦyagjñƗnam, brahmacaryam), but the aim is liberation 
rather than continuation of life in heaven and the persons concerned are ascetics. 
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Here sacrifice and its oblations are playing a role together with the ascetic ele-
ments tapas and Ğrama as parts of the sacrifice.58 See also ĝB 12, 1, 3, 23, where 
even satyam is added to the enumeration and these more or less non-ritualistic 
elements refer to the dƯk܈Ɨ of the Yajamana which precedes the actual perfor-
mance of the ritual.59 
In GB 1, 1, 34 (an Upaniৢad-like portion of this late BrƗhma৆a) the follow-
ing items occur together: prajƗ, karman, tapas, satyam, brahman, which indi-
cates that traditional and innovating or at least originally non-ritualistic concept-
tions became mixed up. There is no reason to assume that here satyam should 
refer to the ethical category of speaking the truth. 
4. Vedic, late-Vedic, post-Vedic and non-Vedic 
lists of virtues or rules of life 
Without any direct connection with the early Vedic concepts of suk܀tam and 
pu۬yam there are also some enumerations of virtues or rules of life, which 
mostly concern the non-ritualists or at least are not especially focused on men 
inside society.60  
In ChU 3, 17, 4, five moral virtues (tapas, dƗnam, Ɨrjavam, ahiۦsƗ and 
satyavacanam) occur in the context of a symbolic sacrifice in which they are 
equated with the Dakৢi৆Ɨs. Here satyavacanam is found instead of satyam. The 
term tapas need not refer to asceticism of the renouncer, because dƗnam and 
renunciation exclude each other. It is true that ahiۦsƗ was associated with re-
nouncers, but it occurred in rather late Vedic dharma texts and the ritualistic 
Vedic texts do not mention ahiۦsƗ as a rule of life before the Upaniৢads, in 
which only ChU twice refers to it. In 3, 17, 4, the symbolic sacrifice should not 
be confused with the interiorisation of Vedic sacrifices out of which renunciation 
would have developed according to some scholars.61  
In VƗsDhS 30, 8, “meditation, truthfulness, patience, modesty, ahiۦsƗ, 
contentment and abhaya represent the purely ascetic substitutes of sacrificial 
entities. Is this, however, really the interiorisation of an actual, specific ritual, or 
58  See BODEWITZ, 2007: 156. 
59  See BODEWITZ, 2007: 156, n. 270.  
60  On the problem of what is “in- or outside Vedism” see BODEWITZ, 1999: 21. 
61  See BODEWITZ, 1999: 27. 
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should not one rather interpret this as the substitution of the ritualistic religious 
way of life by asceticism and renouncement? (BODEWITZ, 1999: 28, n. 19).” 
The five rules of ChU 3, 17, 4 have a partial parallel in Jainism, where 
ahiۦsƗ and satyam (= satyavacanam) likewise occur in a list of five which 
further consists of brahmacaryam, asteyam and aparigraha and originally may 
have represented a list of prohibitions for monks which later became relaxed for 
laymen.62 Buddhism likewise has a slightly different list of five rules and the 
same may be observed about the rules for Yogins in Hinduism. It is clear that 
originally these lists were prescribed for ascetics and that the occurrence of the 
item ahiۦsƗ seems to exclude the possibility that the Vedic tradition, focused on 
the merits of ritual with its bloody sacrifices, can be taken as their starting-point.  
The earliest Vedic references to ahiۦsƗ as one of the rules of life are found 
in ChU 3, 17, 4 and in ChU 8, 15. In both cases a householder is concerned. In 8, 
15 (a late addition forming the conclusion of this Upaniৢad) the prescripts con-
sist of study of the Veda, procreation, concentration on the Ɩtman and being 
ahiۦsant towards all living beings except at Vedic sacrifices. This evidently is a 
late attempt to fit an ascetic rule of life in the Vedic tradition of ritualism. These 
rules of life are also characterized by a concentration on the Ɩtman and the 
reaching of a goal which does not concern immortality after death in heaven but 
reaching (the world of) Brahman and being freed from rebirth. An evident 
attempt to combine tradition with late developments at the end of the Vedic 
period. 
The five rules of life are prescripts, which in the Jaina version are prohibit-
tions where the negation a- is used (ahiۦsƗ, aparigraha and asteyam) before 
sins. Such a correlation of virtues opposed by sins may also be assumed in lists 
of major sins. In ChU 5, 10, 9 we find a list of five (or rather four) major sins: 
stena (theft of gold), drinking of surƗ, having sex with the wife of the Guru, 
killing a Brahmin, and having contact with the performers of these sins. Three 
corresponding virtues are found in the list of Jaina rules (asteyam, brahma-
caryam, ahiۦsƗ), but here the specifications of ChU 5, 10, 9 , where the stealing 
of gold, sexual intercourse with a specific woman and the killing of a Brahmin 
are mentioned, are missing.  
The fivefoldness of the list in the ChU looks rather forced and points to 
borrowing from existing other lists. The specifications seem to concern Brah-
mins as sinners, as also appears from the item of abstention from alcohol, which 
62  See BODEWITZ, 1999: 35. 
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is missing in the Jaina list, but may have been taken from the corresponding 
Buddhist list, and can only apply to Brahmins.63  
It is clear that the list of ChU 5, 10, 9 represents an adaptation of lists from 
outside the Vedic tradition, where they originally applied to ascetics. A really 
fivefold list (not concerning householders) is found in the late Dharmatext 
passage BaudhDhS 2, 10, 18, 2–3 and consists of ahiۦsƗ, satyam, astainyam, 
maithunasya varjanam, tyƗga (= aparigraha), which almost completely agrees 
with the Jaina list and is too late for being a source for the Jains (see BODEWITZ, 
2007 a: 325). 
5. Conclusions 
The noun suk܀tám has been sometimes misinterpreted as the well performed 
sacrifice, but actually it denotes the merit which is mostly (but not exclusively) 
obtained by organizing a sacrifice. It may also refer to liberality, i.e. it denotes 
the giving of goods to gods in heaven and to the Brahmin priests, the gods on 
earth. It is an investment made by a sacrificer in order to reach heaven after 
death. It may even be associated with liberality in general and hospitality. As 
such ethics and morality hardly play a dominant role in this system of producing 
merits, though charity looks like a form of virtue, especially if one compares the 
enumerations of virtues in other cultures and takes a German term like “Wohl-
tätigkeit” into account. The person who is called a suk ´܀t is the wealthy sacrificer 
or a wealthy giver in general who buys his own future. The negative counterpart 
of this noun, du܈k ´܀t, means evil-doer, but is not frequently found in Vedic 
literature.  
Just like suk܀tám the noun pú۬yam denotes merit rather than moral virtue, 
and it is used in similar contexts. The adjective pú۬ya means meritorious rather 
than pure or holy, as some translators have assumed. The noun seems to have 
taken over the role of suk܀tám and in later texts to have adopted some moral 
associations. On the other hand the adjective pú۬ya (and perhaps even the noun 
pú۬yam) sometimes seems to denote what is valuable or prosperous or fortunate 
rather than what is morally good. However, the opposition of pú۬ya(m) and 
pƗpá(m) mostly is based on a moral judgement. Both pu۬yak ´܀t and pƗpak ´܀t do 
not frequently occur in Vedic texts and seem to be late. The successful sacrificer 
63  See BODEWITZ, 1999: 36 and 2007 a: 324 f.  
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becomes pú۬yaloka “whose world in heaven is pu۬ya or obtained by pu۬yam” 
(in PB 12, 11, 12 and ĝB 3, 6, 2, 15), which excludes any association with ethics 
and only refers to merits. These merits often, but not exclusively, concern sacri-
fices just as in the case of suk܀tam. 
The merits or virtues denoted by the general terms suk܀tam and pu۬yam 
qualify the human beings for heaven. Their specifications are not fixed in lists of 
enumerations in the oldest texts which are mainly ritualistic. ৙V 10, 154 forms 
an exception in this respect. This hymn mentions together the sacrificer who has 
given many fees to his priests, the brave warrior who has died in a battle, the 
ascetic who will reach heaven by tápas and the mystic who concentrates his 
attention on cosmic truth or order (the ৙tá). This looks like an enumeration of 
different approaches followed by different categories of human beings. 
The TaittirƯyas show the following development of prescripts, rules of life 
or approaches. In TB 3, 12, 8, 5: satyám, ĞraddhƗ´, tápas, damá (for ascetics?); in 
TU 1, 9: ܀tam, satyam, tapas, dama, Ğama (for ascetics and mystics?) + agnayas, 
agnihotram, mƗnasam, prajƗ, prajananam, prajƗti (for the sacrificing, hospital 
and procreating householders); in MNU 505–516: again twelve items tapas, 
satyam, dama, Ğama + dƗnam, dharma, prajananam + agnayas, agnihotram, yajña, 
mƗnasam + nyƗsa. The last text has an enumeration of rules for ascetics and 
householders and culminates in the life of saীnyƗsins. Similar lists are found in 
other Vedic prose texts (BrƗhmanas and Upaniৢads). 
A clear distinction between duties or rules of life of different types of 
human beings or stages of life occurs in ChU 2, 23, 1–2 (see Section 2.2), where 
the carrying out of these duties produces a pu۬ya loka, which means that, in fact, 
these duties are merits. They are a) sacrifice, study, liberality; b) asceticism; c) 
staying permanently in the house of the Guru.  
As one might expect, sometimes there is a correspondence between the 
cardinal sins and the principal virtues, in which the prohibition of the sins 
represents the virtues. See e.g. ChU 5, 10, 9, where four cardinal sins (stealing 
gold, drinking alcohol, sleeping with the wife of the Guru and killing a Brahmin) 
are mentioned, of which the positive counterparts consist of their prohibitions 
found in Jain and Buddhist texts. The difference is that the sins of ChU 5, 10, 9 
concern the Brahmins as committers or victims of the sins, whereas in the men-
tioned non-Vedic religions prohibitions like non-stealing (asteyam), not killing 
(ahiۦsƗ) and positive prescripts like chastity (brahmacaryam) or abstention 
from sexual intercourse in general are rules of life which primarily concern the 
ascetics or monks and only in a mitigated form the laymen and the married 
people. 
68 HENK W. BODEWITZ 
AS/EA LXVII•1•2013, S. 31–73 
Five virtues or merits are mentioned in ChU 3, 17, 4: tapas, dƗnam, 
Ɨrjavam, ahiۦsƗ and satyavacanam, a mixture of general rules for all kinds of 
human beings and prescripts originally concerning the ascetics. They occur in a 
section in which man’s life is interpreted as a symbolic sacrifice and then these 
five items are the Dakৢi৆Ɨs. 
The three items satyám, ĞraddhƗ´, and t´apas, which were already men-
tioned in TB 3, 12, 8, 5 (see above) together with damá, also occur as items in a 
symbolic sacrifice elsewhere. See e.g. ĝƗnkhB 2, 8, where such a sacrifice has 
been treated.64 They are also found in the passages of ChU 5, 10, 1 and BƖU 6, 
2, 15 on the pit܀yƗna and devayƗna, where in their common source satyam, 
ĞraddhƗ and tapas are associated with the devayƗna and the staying in the 
ara۬ya and the ordinary sacrifices with the pit܀yƗna and the staying in the 
village.65 
Apparently the three mentioned items in one or the other way were associa-
ted with asceticism, and in some contexts an attempt was made to make a com-
promise between different approaches of aims in life and attempts to obtain 
results in life after death. The enumerations of items in the sphere of merits or 
virtues which are associated with different ways of life may illustrate this, as 
appears from lists consisting of purely ritualistic and apparently ascetic ap-
proaches.  
Our final conclusion can only be that the ideas about merits and virtues and 
their results have enormously changed and developed in the course of Vedic 
literature. Reaching heaven by merits is only found in the last stages on the ৙V 
SaীhitƗ. Merits and reaching a continuation of life in heaven lost their rele-
vance, when at the end of the classical Vedic period the theories of karma (pro-
ducing only a temporary life in heaven and a rebirth on earth depending on the 
quality of one’s karman) and of mok܈a (having the release from this rebirth as its 
highest aim) came into existence. The merits of sacrifices and liberality gradual-
ly were replaced by asceticism and knowledge about one’s identity, but attempts 
64  See BODEWITZ, 1973: 240: “The passage ends with tad yathƗ ha vai ĞraddhƗdevasya satya-
vƗdinas tapasvino hutam bhavati evam haivƗsya hutam bhavati ya evaۦ vidvƗn agnihotraۦ 
juhoti.” See also p. 235: “Speaking the truth is regarded as the offering of an oblation in the 
internal fires in ĝB 2, 2, 2, 19” and p. 236 on ĝB 11, 3, 1, 1 ff., where the identification of 
the flame of the fire with ĞraddhƗ and the oblation with satyam occurs: “The truth doctrine 
is not a real mental sacrifice […], it is rather a special way of life implying the speaking of 
truth and the meditation on truth, to be compared with tapas.” 
65  See BODEWITZ, 1973: 250 f. 
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AƖ  Aitareya Ɩra৆yaka 
AB   Aitareya BrƗhma৆a 
AV   Atharva Veda 
Baudh Dh S BaudhƗyana Dharma Sǌtra 
BƖU  B৚had Ɩra৆yaka Upaniৢad 
ChU  ChƗndogya Upaniৢad 
GB  Gopatha BrƗhma৆a 
JB  JaiminƯya BrƗhma৆a 
JUB  JaiminƯya Upaniৢad BrƗhma৆a 
Ka৬hU Ka৬ha Upaniৢad 
KauৢU  KauৢƯtaki Upaniৢad 
Ken U Kena Upaniৢad 
66  In an interesting publication, BRONKHORST, 1998, deals with the development of Indian 
asceticism and discerns two sources: the Vedic asceticism associated with ritualism and the 
non-Vedic asceticism. On p. 65 he first observes: “There is no reason to doubt that Vedic 
asceticism developed […] out of certain aspects of the Vedic sacrifice. It is certainly not im-
possible that this development was aided by the simultaneous existence of non-Vedic forms 
of asceticism, but this seems at present beyond proof.” To some extent I agree with Bronk-
horst, but I have some doubts about the exclusive connection with Vedic ritual. According to 
৙V 10, 154, one could reach heaven by asceticism without any clear association with sacri-
fices. Ascetics and mystics did not receive much attention in the oldest Vedic text, but they 
seem to have been present and accepted already in the earliest period. 
Then Bronkhorst remarks on rebirth and karma: “We have seen that many of the earliest 
passages that introduce these ideas contain themselves indications that they had a non-
Brahmanic origin. What is more, there are numerous passages in early Indian literature […] 
which show that the ideas of rebirth and karman were associated in the Indian mind with 
non-Vedic currents of religion and asceticism.” Indeed, it is evident that orthodox Vedism 
underwent an important change in as far as ideas on life after death are concerned. The 
merits obtained i.a. by rituals lost their importance. External influences may have played an 
important role. 
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MNU MahƗ NƗrƗya৆a Upaniৢad 
Mu৆ঌU Mu৆ঌaka Upaniৢad 
MuU Mu৆ঌaka Upaniৢad 
PB  PañcaviূĞa BrƗhma৆a 
PrU  PraĞna Upaniৢad 
PU  PraĞna Upaniৢad 
৙V  ৙gveda 
ৡaঌvB ৡaঌviূĞa BrƗhma৆a 
ĝƗৄkhB ĝƗৄkhƗyana BrƗhma৆a 
ĝB  ĝatapatha BrƗhma৆a 
TƖ   TaittirƯya Ɩra৆yaka 
TB   TaittirƯya BrƗhma৆a 
TS   TaittirƯya SaূhitƗ 
TU   TaittirƯya Upaniৢad 
VƗs DH S VƗsiৢ৬ha Dharma Sǌtra 
VS  VƗjasaneyi SaূhitƗ 
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